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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper is concerned with Augustine’s palpable exercise of justice. While considering his 
stoic-inspired hierarchy of the laws, the focus here is on Augustine less as the philosopher 
and theologian, but rather as the decisionmaker and influential figure of his time. The ques-
tion is of whether and how Augustine applies his comprehension of the divine agenda to the 
day-to-day legal conflicts in his bishop’s court. The paper looks at Augustine’s interpretation, 
perception and promotion of justice as judge and representative of his congregation. 
 
 
Augustine returned to Africa in 388 a changed man. He and his circle of friends 
had ceased pursuing a public career in imperial service. In Carthage they were 
received as distinguished “Servants of God” and in time would become the in-
fluential group within the African church. Augustine arrived in Hippo during 
the spring of 391 in order to find like-minded people with whom to study the 
Scriptures and to be “humble in the house of God”. However he did not take 
into account Valerius, the old bishop of the Hipponian flock. Valerius, coura-
geously and without regard for church procedure, understood the need of his 
church to recruit talents. He allowed Augustine to set up a monastery and soon 
after gave the meanwhile freshly ordained priest permission to give sermons. In 
395 Augustine was elected as the new bishop and thrown completely into active 
and public life for good. As bishop he was head of the Christian “family” of 
Hippo and had to earn himself a position of strength and authority.1 The office 
came with multiple tasks and he became a busy man. Soon he was famous for 
his knowledgeable preaching and expected to hold sermons all over the place. 
He was to approach officials and to intercede on behalf of debtors or accused; 
prisons had to be visited and people needed protection from being ill-treated. 
Powerful landlords had to read his letters of reproof or advice, when he inter-
                                                 
1 I refer to and recommend the description by P. BROWN, Augustine of Hippo. A Biography. New Edition with 
an Epilogue, Faber & Faber, London (1967) 2002, here: chapters 13-17 (125-197) and the Epilogue, 441-513. 
Well in contrast and stimulating J. O’DONNELL’s Augustine, Sinner and Saint. A New Biography, Ecco, New 
York 2005. 
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vened on behalf of their subordinates. Augustine’s position included guidance 
of his clergy and monastery as well as administrative responsibility for the 
church’s finances. In the provincial councils of Numidia, as well as in the yearly 
councils of the whole African church, he took part in the forming of canons, 
regulations and prohibitions; sanctions and directives for practice, both useful 
and essential for the growing body of the Catholic church. There church policy 
and jurisdiction were shaped and frequently delegates were sent to the imperial 
court to make suggestions for reform. Back in Hippo, Augustine’s secretarium 
was daily crowded with neighbours who fought over their properties or families 
who bitterly battled over their father’s will. They all expected Augustine to listen 
and settle their grievances.2 
This is only a rough sketch of Augustine’s versatile curriculum, the philoso-
pher and church father we know of today. His philosophy of law and justice 
built on ancient philosophy; he stimulated theological questions for the time 
and for more thinkers to come. Correspondingly, Augustine’s thoughts devel-
oped from communicating with imperial ministers, provincial governors, local 
elites, city councillors, farmers, land-owners or other clerics relating to issues of 
his time. His theoretical agenda built on and was mirrored in practice. Hence 
the question arises how his theories complemented his actions. What value and 
recognition did Augustine give his theories on justice in the legal discourse he 
confronted as bishop of a coastal town in Late Roman Africa? 
Of Ambrose, the statesman turned bishop, we know that he decided against 
a certain Marcellus, who was in a financial dispute with his sisters, although the 
laws were on his side. Ambrose cited the Scriptures in his verdict and main-
tained that Marcellus should be a generous Christian and forego money.3 Did 
Augustine fancy such bold originality? A close look therefore is to be cast on 
Augustine’s interpretation, perception and promotion of justice in some of his 
day-to-day legal conflicts. With his focus on God and his Christian community, 
how did he confront the ancient legal tradition and the prevailing law? What 
value did he give it in his actions? The question is how Augustine applied his 
theory of justice when addressing judges, officers and colleagues. What did he 
perceive to be their and his own role and duty in bridging the gap between the 
almost inaccessible divine order and the often inadequate laws of the time? 
An outline of the philosophical background (1) will provide the tools to de-
velop Augustine’s perception of an ordinary judge’s tasks in this regard (2). 
                                                 
2 Cf. BROWN, Augustine, 222. 
3 Cf. AMBR. Ep. 82, 6 (PL 16, 1277): Itaque vide, quid dicat apostolus: quare non magis fraudem patimini? Ut 
propre videatur qui non patitur, fecisse; tolerare enim debet qui fortior est. See E. PIELER, Gerichtsbarkeit, in 
Reallexikon für Antike ud Christentum, vol. X (1978), 391-487, 472f.; F. MARTROYE, Une sentence arbitrale 
de Saint Ambroise, «Revue historique de Droit français et étranger», 8 (1929), 300-311; N.B. MCLYNN, 
Ambrose of Milan, University of California Press, Berkeley 1994, 270; on Ambrose, critical of Roman Law also 
J. GAUDEMET, Droit Romain et Patristique Latine, in Miscellanea Historiae Ecclesiasticae VI, Congrès de 
Varsovie, Nauwelaerts, Bruxelles 1983, 165-181, here 175f. 
Justice Applied by the Episcopal Arbitrator 
 73
How should a judge adopt norms and tackle disputes? What is the judge’s part 
in this enterprise of looking for laws and decisions that complement divine will 
and justice? The role and duty of judges can be well depicted in Augustine’s 
intercession with two imperial magistrate-judges, Apringius and Marcellinus on 
behalf of some Donatist perpetrators. Thirdly the focus will be on the bishop as 
judge in particular (3): in what respect is the clerical office a useful vehicle to 
transport and substantiate divine justice? How and with what legitimation did 
Augustine apply his comprehension of the divine agenda to a specific conflict? 
Augustine wrote many treaties in which he reflects on matters at a general level, 
as in the City of God or his pamphlets against heresies. They were well re-
flected assessments written for larger audiences.4 Some letters though were 
above all notes for people on a matter of temporary concern, swiftly dictated 
letters to be sent through a messenger waiting. They draw us closer to the 
Augustine who actively took a stand on matters. In these moments, philosophi-
cal or theological impact was a secondary preoccupation for the bishop. In less 
self-conscious routine, Augustine’s primary thought was to find arguments and 
means of persuasion for a distinct behaviour that complimented his ‘just cause’; 
firsthand evidence of his intentions for the society he was surrounded by. Let-
ters 8* and 9* of the Divjak collection provide material for both the question of 
a bishop’s role and Augustine’s relation to contemporary law and justice.5 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 On how and for whom Augustine invented and staged himself with his oeuvres see e.g. BROWN, Augustine, 
297ff.; N.B. MCLYNN, Augustine’s Roman Empire, «Augustinian Studies», 30/2 (1999), 29-44; O’DONNELL, 
Augustine, 35-86 (“Augustine confesses”). 
5 Freshly printed and on its way to libraries and curious readers is K. UHALDE’s book with the promising title: 
Expectations of Justice in the Age of Augustine, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2007. For a 
comprehensive bibliography on the abundant research on Augustine’s concepts of justice see P. CURBELIÉ’s 
recently published book La justice dans la Cité de Dieu, Institut d’Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 2004. It con-
tains 489 narrowly printed pages and a 41-page bibliography of more than 1300 titles, — “a major contribution to 
the understanding of an important theme in The City of God.” (cf. G. BONNER’s review in «The Journal of 
theological Studies», 57 [2006], 744-746). R. DODARO, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004 is instructive on Augustine’s Christology; G. CATAPANO (ed.), 
Sant’Agostino. La giustizia, Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana - Città Nuova, Roma 2004 provides a useful anthol-
ogy of how the term justice is used in Augustine’s œuvre. On Augustine’s involvement in solicitation and im-
plementation of legislation on imperial and local levels see E.T. HERMANOWICZ’s intriguing discussion of the 
Calama riots: Catholic Bishops and Appeals to the Imperial Court: A Legal Study of the Calama Riots in 408, 
«Journal of Early Christian Studies», 12/4 (2004), 481-521. D. DOYLE’s book The Bishop as Disciplinarian in 
the letters of St. Augustine, Lang, New York 2002 has a chapter on Augustine’s use of Roman law; compare 
also S. ELM, Der Asket als “vir publicus”: Die Bedeutung von Augustin’s Konzept des “Christus iustus et iustifi-
cans” für den spätantiken Asketen als Bischof, in J. MEHLHAUSEN (ed.), Recht, Macht, Gerechtigkeit, Kaiser, 
Gütersloh 1998, 192-201; C. MAYER, Legitimation des Rechts bei Augustinus, in G. KÖBLER (ed.), Geschicht-
liche Rechtswissenschaft: ars tradendo innovandoque aequitatem sectandi. Freundesgabe für Alfred Söllner 
zum 60. Geburtstag am 5.2.1990, Brühlscher Verlag, Gießen 1990, 383-401. 
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1. Augustine’s Philosophy on the Laws 
 
Roman Stoic tradition defined justice as correlation of earthly regulation with 
eternal cosmic law. Law was “right reason applied to command and prohibi-
tion”, stated Cicero.6 The law of justice was not handed down from gods to 
men, but all human beings were born with the seed of virtue that they could 
develop.7 Man’s reason could teach the virtues of goodness, justice and wisdom. 
So through the reason within him, man had access to natural law and the pre-
cepts of moral behaviour.8 This view implied a strong denial of any positivism 
concerning law: if justice were made only by decisions of a people, constitutions 
and verdicts of judges, it could be legitimate to commit adultery, to rob and 
forge.9  
 
 
1.1. Augustine’s Layout of the Laws  
 
Like Cicero, Augustine distinguished the lex aeterna from the lex naturalis and 
the lex temporalis. But to him, the lex aeterna was the will and wisdom of a per-
sonal Creator, the eternal reason and will of God. He commanded the obser-
vance of the natural order of things and forbade the disturbance of it.10 The con-
tent of the lex aeterna was to preserve the order of creation; this was the object 
of their incommutabiles regulae. In God’s creation, in this ordo naturalis, every-
thing had its due order and as a reflection of the divine, the lex naturalis or lex 
intima was the imprint of the lex aeterna on the human soul: “therefore, to ex-
                                                 
6 CIC. Leg. I, 6, 18f: lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque 
contraria. Eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est[referring to the doctissimis viris 
proficisci].... [and in his own words ...](19)...a lege ducendum est iuris exordium. Ea est enim naturae vis, ea 
mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque iniuriae regula ... (I quote the Tusculum edition by R. Nickel: M.T. 
CICERO, De legibus. Paradoxa stoicorum. Über die Gesetze. Stoische Paradoxien. Lateinisch und deutsch, 
München 1994, 22ff.). 
7 See especially CIC. Leg. I, 8, 24f, where according to Cicero the seed of the human race was sown over the 
earth and granted the divine gift of the soul (quandum maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod sparsum in 
terras atque satum divino auctum sit animorum munere, ...) and where he proclaims men’s similarity with the 
gods: Iam vero virtus eadem in homine ac deo est (Nickel’s edition, 28ff.). 
8 See M.C. HOROWITZ, Stoic Synthesis of Natural Law, «Journal of the History of Ideas», 35 (1974), 3-16. 
9 See CIC. Leg. I, 16, 43: Quodsi populorum iussis, si in principium decretis, si sententiis iudicium iura 
constituerentur, ius esset latrocinari, ius adulterare, ius testamenta falsa supponere, si haec suffragiis aut scitis 
multitudinis probarentur (Nickel’s ed., 48); E.-W. BÖCKENFÖRDE, Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatsphiloso-
phie. Antike und Mittelalter, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2002, 158f; A. DIEHLE, Gerechtigkeit, in Reallexikon 
für Antike und Christentum, vol. X (1978), 233-360 (on the Stoa especially 266ff.). 
10 See AUG. C. Faust. XXII, 27 (CSEL 25/1, 621): Lex aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem natu-
ralem conservari iubens, perturbari vetans, and A.-H. CHROUST, The Philosophy of Law of St. Augustine, 
«The Philosophical Review», 53 (1944), 196. 
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plain briefly how I value the notion which is impressed on us by eternal law, it is 
the law by which it is just that everything should have its due order”.11 
Yet, the perception of the divine law had become faint. According to 
Augustine, since Adam’s fall man was free only to do evil, but not good: con-
trary to Pelagius’s opinion, man could not autonomously arise again, nor under-
stand and be good. In order to understand the lex aeterna and to grasp truly 
what was just and what was not, all human beings depended on God’s grace.12 
The bewildering discontinuity of human action and circumstance was the result 
of weakness and ignorance (infirmitas et ignorantia); time and time again they 
were getting in the way and stood in contrast to the invincible purpose of an 
omnipotent God.13 For Augustine this resulted in the paradox of the need for 
God’s privilege of grace on the one hand and free will on the other.  
But a reconciling view could be found already in the New Testament. In the 
Gospel of John, Christ was identified with the logos, a term that conveyed mul-
tiple traditions and encouraged diverse images and could be understood as 
“word” of the Jewish God become fact, but also echoed the cosmic law (to say it 
in German, the Weltgesetz) of classical philosophy.14 For Augustine in like fash-
ion, men’s weakness and ignorance could be overcome by Christ, who was the 
incarnate solution to men’s need for God’s direct mediation.15 Christ (through 
Paul) could help decipher the truth inscribed in men’s soul, a revelation that 
Augustine experienced himself reading the Holy Scripture in a garden one day. 
 
Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova, sero te amavi! Et 
ecce intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quærebam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, 
                                                 
11 AUG. Div. qu. 53, 2 (CCL 44A, 88): transcripta est naturalis lex in animam rationalem; Lib. arb. I, 6, 15 
(CSEL 74, 15f.): …ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae inpressa nobis est, quantum valeo, verbis 
explicem, ea est, qua iustum est, ut omnia sint ordinatissimma. I have taken the translation of quae inpressa 
nobis est from ST. AUGUSTINE, The Problem of Free Choice, transl. by M. Pontifex (Ancient Christian Writ-
ers, 22), Newman Press, London 1955, 49. See also Pontifex’ extensive note on “the truth within you that is the 
source of all instruction”, 245ff. 
12 See e.g. AUG. Nat. et gr. 19 (CSEL 60, 245): aliud intellegere velle nec posse et facere contra legem non intel-
ligendo quid fieri velit; H. WELZEL, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit. Prolegomena zu einer Rechtsphi-
losophie, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1951, 53f. 
13 See P. BROWN, St. Augustine’s Attitude to Religious Coercion, «Journal of Roman Studies», 54 (1964), 111. 
14 Joh. 1,1-18 (prologue): “In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was fully 
God … and the Word became flesh …”. The Creator of the book Genesis is evoked here, of course, but also 
the Divine Wisdom of e.g. Proverbs 8, 22-31, already a similar conception to the universal principle of Greek 
thought. Justin’s interpretation for instance was influenced by Stoicism, when he presented Christ as the logos 
spermatikos who ‘inhabits everybody’ (cf. Apol. App. 10, 8). On the adaptability of the word logos and the 
understanding of the Johannine Gospel there is much and also much biased controversy. I found E.L. MILLER, 
The Johannine Origins of the Johannine Logos, «Journal of biblical Literature», 112 (1993), 445-457 quite 
useful, or: H.P. THYSSEN, Philosophical Christology in the New Testament, «Numen», 53 (2006), 133-176. In 
patristic thought also Rom 2,14ff. and Mt 7,12 would often be quoted: the divine order is there all along, but 
Jesus Christ brings new perception of it; see BÖCKENFÖRDE, Geschichte, 195. 
15 See DODARO, Christ and the Just Society, 70f. Augustine’s model for Christ as the instructor is again Cicero’s 
vir optimus: see ELM, Der Asket, 199. 
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deformis inruebam. mecum eras, et tecum non eram. ea me tenebant longe a 
te, quae si in te non essent, non essent. vocasti et clamasti et rupisti 
surditatem meam, coruscasti, splenduisti et fugasti caecitatem meam, fragasti, 
et duxi spiritum et anhelo tibi, gustavi et esurio et sitio, tetigisti me, et exarsi 
in pacem tuam. (Conf. X, 27, 38, CSEL 33, 255) 
 
I have learnt to love you late, Beauty at once so ancient and so new! I 
have learnt to love you late! You were within me, and I was in the world out-
side myself. I searched for you outside myself and, disfigured as I was, I fell 
upon the lovely things of your creation. You were with me, but I was not with 
you. The beautiful things of this world kept me far from you and yet, if they 
had not been in you, they would have had no being at all. You called me; you 
cried aloud to me; you broke my barrier of deafness. You shone upon me; 
your radiance enveloped me; you put my blindness to flight. You shed your 
fragrance about me; I drew breath and now I gasp for your sweet odour. I 
tasted you, and now I hunger and thirst for you. You touched me, and I am 
inflamed with the love of your peace. (trans. by R.S. Pine-Coffin)16 
 
As here, Augustine often alluded to the five senses. Yet as he described the 
moment of his conversion, he changed the usual order. He mentions hearing 
first, since he first listened to the Word.17 Christ and the Scriptures had become 
the source of resurrection for the fallen man. 
 
 
1.2. The Conditional Validity of Man-made Law and Justice 
 
The correlation of divine law and justice with the lex naturalis again meant the 
theoretical rejection of any value in themselves of the rules of the lex humana, 
the leges temporales. Laws and rules of the world were only binding if they were 
in accordance with divine law. The lex temporalis was forever changeable. It 
was positive law that had to be adjusted to time and place. It was only binding 
and just, were it drawn from the eternal law of God, which never changed: “I 
think you can also see that in the temporal law nothing is just and lawful that 
men do not derive from eternal law”18, Augustine explained, and he would go 
                                                 
16 Augustine describes the moment of his conversion in Conf. VIII, 12, 29-30 (reading Paul, Rom. 13,13-14: 
“…put on the lord Jesus Christ…”). Here, in Conf. X, 27, 38, his theory of illumination on the inscribed law is 
beautifully reflected. The ordo naturalis relates to the divine order. 
17 See M. BOULDING’s note to her translation of the passage (Conf. X, 27, 38) in The works of Saint Augustine 
I/1, 262. 
18 AUG. Lib. arb. I, 6, 15 (CSEL 74, 15f.): Simul etiam te videre arbitror in illa temporalis nihil esse iustum 
atque legitimum quod non ex hac aeterna sibi homines derivaverint. The translations throughout the article 
strongly bear on the translations given in The works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century, New 
City Press, New York. 
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further and hold that non est autem ius ubi nulla est iustitia19 – “but there is no 
law, where there is no justice”. A temporal law that was not just was not a law 
and did not cause obligation, “for, if the emperors were in error – God forbid! 
– they would issue laws in favour of their error against the truth, and by those 
laws the good would be tested and receive crowns as their reward for not doing 
what the emperors commanded, because God forbade it”. 20 – If to envision this 
was such an atrocity, what were the leges temporales useful for? 
 
 
1.3. The Value of the “leges temporales” 
 
Though Augustine revived Cicero’s view that temporal laws depended for their 
value on the eternal law, he was aware of the need for implementation of tem-
poral rules and regulations. The dynamic of change required Augustine’s law-
maker to know when a just law had to be modified to bring about a sound re-
flection of the eternal, unchangeable principles. Augustine derived the need for 
rule and order from the necessity of a restoring order and peace. Since Adam’s 
fall men could live peacefully together only under the authority of rules accom-
panied by sanctions.21 Man achieved justice in a peaceful society when there 
were laws made by men for their fellow men22, where justice was “the virtue that 
assigns to every man his due”.23  
                                                 
19 AUG. Civ. XIX, 21 (CSEL 40/2, 408). With his opposition to the Pelagian model of ‘self-perfection’ (emanci-
patus a deo, C. Iul. imp. I, 78, Augustine also replaced Cicero’s concept of ius with the concept of vera iustitia: 
see ELM, Der Asket, 197; P. HAWKINS, Polemical Counterpoint in De civitate Dei, «Augustinian Studies», 6 
(1975), 97-106. 
20 AUG. Ep. 105, 2, 7, written after the year 406 (CSEL 34/1, 599): Imperatores enim si in errore essent, quod 
absit, pro errore suo contra veritatem leges darent, per quas iusti et probarentur et coronarentur non faciendo, 
quod illi iuberent, quia deus prohiberet; Cresc. III, 51, 56 (CSEL 52, 462): Reges cum in errore sunt, pro ipso 
errore leges contra veritatem ferunt; cum in veritate sunt, similiter contra errorem pro ipsa veritate decernerunt: 
ita legibus malis probantur boni et legibus bonis emendantur mali. In Lib. arb. I, 5, 11, (CSEL 74, 12) he was 
explicit: Nam mihi lex esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit (“so an unjust law does not seem to me to be a 
law”) And in Civ. IV, 4 Augustine would reference Cicero’s De legibus I, 16, 43: remota iustitia, quid sunt regna 
nisi magna latrocinia? 
21 Cf. BÖCKENFÖRDE, Geschichte, 200, 209. 
22 See AUG. Civ. XIX, 6 (CSEL 40/2, 381): Quid ipsa iudicia hominum de hominibus, quae civitatibus in 
quantalibet pace manentibus deesse non possunt, qualia putamus esse, quam misera, quam dolenda? Quando 
quidem hi iudicant qui conscientias eorum, de quibus iudicant, cernere nequeunt (“What of those judgements 
pronounced by men on their fellow men, which are indispensable in cities however deep the peace that reigns 
in them? How sad, how lamentable we find them, since those who pronounce them cannot look into the con-
sciences of those whom they judge.” Transl. by W.C. GREENE, The Loeb Classical Library, vol. VI, 143). 
23 AUG. Civ. XIX, 21 (CSEL 40/2, 408f.): Iustitia porro ea virtus est quae sua cuique distribuit. This definition of 
justice is also to be found in Dig. 1, 1, 10 pr. (Pseudo-Ulpian) and Inst. 1, 1 pr.; cf. D. LIEBS, Römisches Recht, 
6th completely rev. ed., Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, 62: Iustitia est constans et perpetua volun-
tas ius suum cuique tribuendi. For the shift in Augustine’s thought away from the ancient model, cf. R. DO-
DARO, Justice, in A.D. FITZGERALD (ed.), Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia, Eerdmans, Grand 
Rapids (Michigan) - Cambridge 1999, 482. 
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Worldly rule then had to consort with divine order. Their function was to 
guard peace.24 Yet the implications of this concept remained unclear.25 What 
then did temporal laws mean for the individuals and their interactions in 
Augustine’s view? It seems that the leges temporales were not truly necessary 
for the people gifted with grace. Since they could derive their idea of just behav-
iour from their soul and reason, where – God given – they could understand 
and follow the lex aeterna. For those remaining, secular prohibitions and rules 
of the lex temporalis were helpful criteria. They told them what ought and what 
ought not to be done. The worldly rules and sanctions helped the weak — deaf 
to traces of the divine in their souls — to behave correctly.26 Despite his verdict 
that man-made laws were dependent on their relation to divine principles, 
Augustine was pragmatic on the issue. He thought it safer to have a body of 
rules on which a society could lean.27 Therefore he is often met promoting obe-
dience to the authorities and the law. He complied with legal custom, the impe-
rial rescripts and constitutions.28 
In the organization of the Roman Empire Augustine found some common 
sense of right. He was mostly happy with what was intended and that there was 
order, despite imperfection. “Often”, he said, “the laws that govern the civitates 
allow something or leave something unpunished, what divine justice would 
condemn. Yet, the notion that not all is provided for, must not lead to the con-
clusion that the existing regulations should be disapproved”.29 All problems 
                                                 
24 Cf. S. COTTA, Droit et justice dans le De libero arbitrio de St. Augustin, «Archiv für Rechts- und Staatsphi-
losophie», 47 (1961), 159f, 164. He sees Augustine’s understanding of a social utility of temporal law as inde-
pendent of morality. Avarice, greed and selfishness cause the need in a social union for prohibitions and sanc-
tions and for rule (cf. ibid. 167). On cupiditas gloriae humanae and amor sui, see also J. CHRISTES, Christliche 
und heidnisch-römische Gerechtigkeit in Augustins De civitate Dei, «Rheinisches Museum», 123 (1980), 167. 
25 Since Augustine was often more concerned with the relation to God: see BÖCKENFÖRDE, Geschichte, 209. 
26 Cf. AUG. Cresc. III, 51, 56 (CSEL 52, 462): ita legibus malis probantur boni et legibus bonis emendantur 
mali. 
27 Cf. COTTA, Droit et justice, 169: “le droit n’a pas le but d’assurer la béatitude, mais seulement la sécurité”; 
R.W. DYSON, Normative Theories of Society and Government in Five Medieval Thinkers, Edwin Mellen 
Press, Lewiston 2003, 33ff. 
28 In Augustine’s struggle against the Donatists and the Pelagians the emperor supported his Catholic party and 
he was forever arguing that law enforcement served the common good and that disobedience to imperial rules 
did not automatically create martyrs. Cf. e.g. the letters that he wrote to the governors of Africa (see endnote 61 
below). Cf. E.-L. GRASMÜCK, Coercitio. Staat und Kirche im Donatistenstreit, Roehrscheid, Bonn 1964, 207. 
Augustine failed to see the implications and inherent dangers of such acceptance. Cf. O’DONNELL, Augustine, 
201: “Augustine never theorizes a world in which Christians would dominate the secular realm indefinitely and 
with confidence…”. 
29 AUG. Lib. arb. I, 5, 13 (CSEL 74, 13f): Videtur enim tibi lex ista, quae regendis civitatibus fertur, multa 
concedere atque impunita relinquere, quae per divinam tamen providentiam vindicantur, et recte. Neque enim 
quia non omnia facit, ideo quae facit improbanda sunt. 
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could be settled somehow. Thus the individual was guarded against over-
estimating oneself, thinking that she or he could know better.30  
From this reassuring position, Augustine taught his congregation another 
form of justice. Accepting the laws of property, the Christian mind superseded 
obedience toward the laws of the world by a Christian concept of justice: caritas 
meant that one used one’s property to do good. As for the rich man of Luke 
16,10, who was rich with what belonged to him, Augustine moralized: “if you 
want to hear what that rich man’s crime was, look no further than what you hear 
from the Truth: he was rich. He used to wear purple and fine linen, and feast 
sumptuously every day. So what was his offence? The man lying at his gate cov-
ered with sores, and given no help”.31 
 
 
2. The Duty and Qualities of a Judge 
 
Ideally the individual had to decide what was to be done and how to behave at 
any given moment. In the realm of God’s grace this was possible for each and 
every person.32 The contradiction of the privilege of God’s grace and free will 
was in Augustine’s eyes solved by mysterious incorporation. The individual’s 
self-determination was part of the natural order, Augustine did not altogether 
deny it.33 Esto iudex in te, be judge of yourself, he demanded of his listeners in a 
sermon and referred to the inner conscience as the judge who could know right 
from wrong: “if you have conducted this hearing well, if you have conducted it 
honestly, if you have been just in conducting it, if you have climbed onto the 
judicial tribunal of your mind, if you have suspended yourself on the torture 
rack of your heart before your own eyes, if you have applied to yourself the tor-
tures of fear, then you have heard the case well”.34 Yet – free will allowed the 
conscience dispute and decision for the bad … 
                                                 
30 Cf. P. BROWN, Sozialpolitische Anschauungen Augustins, in C. ANDRESEN (ed.), Zum Augustin-Gespräch 
der Gegenwart, vol. II, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1981, 183ff. Also DIEHLE, Gerechtig-
keit, 352-358, gives a good summary of Augustine’s take on justice. 
31 AUG. S. 178, 3 (PL 38, 962): quod ergo ejus crimen? Jacens ante januam ulcerosus, et non adjutus. See also 
e.g. Ep. 153, 26 or Vera rel. 14, 21. Cf. J. GAUDEMET, La formation du droit séculier et du droit de l’èglise aux 
IVe et Ve siècles, Sirey, Paris 19792, 178; F.-J. THONNARD, Justice de Dieu et justice humaine selon saint 
Augustin, «Augustinus», 12 (1967), 387-402. COTTA, Droit et justice, 169, maybe a little too readily, breaks it 
down to the separation of law and morality. 
32 In Ep. 120, 6 (CSEL 34, 708-710), Augustine encouraged Consentius’s faith by giving an example of how 
through redeeming confusion the wise man could through Christ become “the wise and strong among the weak 
whom God had chosen”. Cf. Vera rel. 31, 58. 
33 BROWN, St. Augustine’s Attitude, 111 calls it Augustine’s tendency to think in terms of processes rather than 
of isolated acts. Augustine was mainly critical of the self-righteousness in Pelagian thought: see BROWN, 
Augustine, 340-353. 
34 AUG. S. 13, 7 (CCL 41, 182): Si bene audisti, si recte ausdisti, si in audiendo te iustus fuisti, si tuae mentis 
tribunal ascendisti, sit e ipsum ante te ipsum in eculeum cordis suspendisti, si graves tortures adhibuisti timoris, 
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In case of injury or conflict between two parties, a judge found the correct 
answers for them; decide in legal matters and punish violations of the law.35 
Augustine took a static view and gave the judge little flexibility to act. The judge 
in contrast to the law-maker was bound closely to the leges: 
 
Conditor tamen legum temporalium, si vir bonus est et sapiens, ille ipsam 
consulit aeternam de qua nulli animae iudicare datum est, ut secundum eius 
incommutabiles regulas quid sit pro tempore iubendum vetandumque 
discernat. Aeternam igitur legem mundis animis fas est cognoscere, iudicare 
non fas est.(Vera rel. 31, 58, CSEL 77, 42) 
 
It’s the same with these temporal laws: although human beings make 
judgments about them when enacting them, nonetheless, once they have 
been enacted and confirmed, none will have the right to make judgements 
about them, but only to judge in accordance with them. Still, the maker of 
temporal laws, if he is a good and wise man, will consult that eternal law itself, 
which no soul has been given the right to judge, so that in accordance with its 
immutable regulations he may discern what at this juncture in time is to be 
commanded and forbidden. Acquiring knowledge of the eternal law there-
fore is the sacred right of the unspotted minds, while for passing judgments 
on it, there is no such right. (transl. by E. Hill) 
 
On the level of the laws, Augustine perceived it to be the law-maker’s privi-
lege to decide, but he insinuated that this law-maker was in fact a wise man. 
Emperor may (he) be, only the unspotted mind had the right to make evalua-
tion of the divine laws. So it remained an ambiguous explanation that left room 
for interpretation.36 Augustine obtained his law-makers’ privilege from observing 
his own times, where law-making was more and more restricted to the emperor 
and his representatives.37 A iudex pedaneus was put in charge by the magistrate 
and delegated to follow procedure according to precisely ordered steps; he had 
only the facultas iudicandi;38 whereas imperial magistrates also had the iurisdic-
______________________ 
bene audisti. S. 13 was held in Carthage on May 27th, 418. The translation is taken from B.D. SHAW, Judicial 
Nightmares and Christian Memory, «Journal of early Christian Studies», 11/4 (2003), 550. 
35 Cf. CURBELIÉ’s chapters on the qualities of a judge, “Augustin juge”, “Augustin intercessor” etc., 389-404; 
using different letters and sermons. See also A. PUGLISE, Sant’Agostino giudice, in Studi dedicati alla memoria 
di Paolo Ubaldi (Pubblicazioni della Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 5th s., 16), Vita e Pensiero, Milano 
1937-1946, 272ff. 
36 On the developing distinction between eternal law and natural order in Augustine see R.A. MARKUS, Saecu-
lum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1970, 88ff. 
37 See LIEBS, Römisches Recht, 47, 69, 82f. on the decline of the possibility of the magistrate to develop new 
law. 
38 This reflects the old tradition whereby a iudex is instructed by the praetor to decide according to a strict for-
mula: see LIEBS, Römisches Recht, 37f. 
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tio. This gave the latter more freedom in regard to choice of punishment.39 
Administration and jurisdiction were not separated. The magistrate had the 
right both to execution and to ‘speak the law’. His duty to regard the laws and 
also to respect the parties’ interests limited his cognitio.40 A verdict could theo-
retically be appealed. The emperors thus had their body of jurisdiction well un-
der control and monopolized both law-making and law-giving.41 The fines with 
which magistrates were threatened with for not applying the laws show how 
much the emperor mistrusted his own officials. Imperial legislation proves that 
often attempts were made to secure the moral integrity of their judges.42  
 
 
2.1. The Exemplary Conduct of the “assessor” Alypius 
 
Similar to such imperial attempts and thus not revolutionary, Augustine de-
manded of judges specific qualities. Alypius, the later bishop and then only as-
sessor at the court of the comes largitionum in Rome, was craftily drawn out in 
Augustine’s Confessions as example of how a judge in the imperial administra-
tion should act. A powerful senator wanted something of Alypius that was not 
permitted by the law (per leges inlicitum), but Alypius could neither be asked, 
nor bribed nor threatened. His boss, the judge, followed his example and so the 
rules were not broken.43 A small detail was meant to exemplify the character of 
                                                 
39 Cf. PLIN. Ep. 4, 9, 17; ULPIANUS in Dig. 48, 19, 13; 48, 13, 7(6); 48, 19, 9, § 11. According to Ulpian the 
legal penalty may be either alleviated or aggravated at the discretion of the judge, in case of ordinary crimes (for 
murder: Marcianus in Dig. 48, 8, 3, § 5). Cf. B. SANTALUCIA, Diritto e processo penale nell´antica Roma, 
Giuffrè, Milano 1998, p. 241ff., esp. 247; W. REIN, Das Criminalrecht der Römer von Romulus bis auf Justi-
nianus. Ein Hülfsbuch zur Erklärung der Classiker und der Rechtsquellen für Philologen und Juristen nach den 
Quellen bearbeitet, Leipzig 1844, 69; J. STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law, Vol II, 
170, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1912 (reprint Ed. Rodopi, Amsterdam 1969), 160f. 
40 See PIELER, Gerichtsbarkeit, 394f. This administrator-iudex was much less restricted than has been held in 
former legal history, e.g. by E. Levy or L. Wenger (“Richter am Gängelband”). See also J. PLESCIA, Judicial 
Accountability and Immunity in Roman Law, «The American Journal of Legal History», 45 (2001), 51-70. 
41 Cf. LIEBS, Römisches Recht, 69f. 
42 Cf. the whole chapter in the Digest. Ulpian, Dig. 21, 10, held that a governor must not receive gifts, judges had 
to come from other places etc. E. Levy emphasizes the judge’s restriction and gives examples: see his Gesetz 
und Richter im Kaiserlichen Strafrecht, in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. II, ed. by W. Kunkel & M. Kaser, Boeh-
lau, Köln 1963, 499ff. In the particular case of the church, it was the result of the bishops’ telltale to Ravenna’s 
courts. Especially the African bishops lodged complaints, asked for mercy and successfully bid for firmer legis-
lation: see HERMANOWICZ, Catholic Bishops, e.g. 496. 
43 AUG. Conf. VI, 10, 16 (CSEL 33, 130f.): Romae asidebat comiti largitionum Italicianarum erat eo tempore 
quidam potentissimus senator, cuius et beneficiis obstricti multi et terrori subditi erant. voluit sibi licere nescio 
quid ex more potentiae suae, quod esset per leges inlicitum; restitit Alypius. promissum est praemium; inrisit 
animo. praetentae minae; calcavit mirantibus omnibus inusitatam animam, quae hominem tantum et 
innumerabilibus praestandi nocendique modis ingenti fama celebrantum vel amicum non optaret vel non 
formidaret inimicum. ipse autem iudex, cui consiliarius erat, quamvis et ipse fieri nollet, non tamen aperte 
recusabat, sed in istum causam transferens ab eo se non permitti adserebat, quia et re vera, si ipse faceret, iste 
discederet …. 
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his friend and the behaviour required of a good judge44: Alypius at the time had 
the grand opportunity to be weak on his favourite hobby of collecting literature. 
He could easily have had codices copied out for himself at the expense of the 
emperor’s treasury, but he did not do so. Despite temptation, Alypius’ sense for 
justice prevailed. A judge’s personal moral integrity was essential for the office. 
In the design of his Confessions, Augustine told a story of how his by then epis-
copal colleague and friend had given an example and had encouraged the judge 
to withstand corruption. 
Augustine however moderated Alypius’ virtue: he had been infected with in-
sania then, because “on his way back from lunch one day he had gotten carried 
away by a well-nigh incredible hunger for the gladiatorial games” – and had 
“watched, cheered, burnt” and “drunk in the savagery”.45 This could have hap-
pened, since then he had merely trusted in himself and only later had placed 
confidence exclusively in God.46 
 
 
2.2. The Obligation of Christian Judges 
 
Augustine explicitly took on the rhetoric of what in particular was required from 
a Christian judge. There is a fitting passage on the difference Augustine drew 
between a Christian and a non-Christian judge:47 The Christian proconsul 
Apringius was in charge of trials against some Donatist people who had mur-
dered and beaten Catholic priests. This was at the end of the year 411, shortly 
after the conference of Carthage. Again the issue of religious peace had been 
settled in favour of Augustine’s Catholic party. The imperial commissioner, 
who had presided over the conference, was Marcellinus, brother of Apringius 
and Augustine’s new friend.48 Marcellinus was actively engaged with the enact-
ment of the laws against the Donatists. Upon his verdict the emperor had pro-
scribed Donatism. The clergy was to be separated and exiled, fines had to be 
                                                 
44 And he quotes Lk 16, 10ff., “he who is faithful in a small matter will be faithful in a great matter, too…”. 
45 AUG. Conf. VI, 8, 13 (CSEL 33,128): ...spectavit, clamavit, exarsit, abstulit inde secum insaniam ...et inde 
tamen manu validissima et misericordissima eruisti eum tu et docuisti eum non sui habere, sed tui fiduciam, sed 
longe postea. 
46 Cf. Th. FUHRER, Zwischen Glauben und Gewissheit: Auf der Suche nach Gott und dem ‚vitae modus’, in N. 
FISCHER - C. MAYER (ed.), Die Confessiones des Augustinus von Hippo. Einführung und Interpretation zu den 
dreizehn Büchern, Herder, Freiburg 20042, 260f., connecting paragraph 16 to paragraph 13 of book VI. 
47 AUG. Ep. 134 to Apringius (CSEL 44, 84-88). Since 408 everybody in imperial office was Christian, but often 
in name only (cf. Honorius’ law: Cod. Theod. 16, 10, 19).  
48 On Augustine’s politically marginal role in African and Roman politics until 412 see MCLYNN, Augustine’s 
Roman Empire; the new friendship (ibid. 46ff.) “offered Augustine access to the empire at a new level and gave 
him, at last, a platform from which to address Marcellinus’ peers”, and thus the dedication of his City of God to 
his dearest son was “not incidental”. 
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paid and Donatist property was to be handed over to the Catholics.49 The of-
fences of murder and the injuries were usually under the jurisdiction of the pro-
consul, but in the person of Marcellinus a special imperial commissioner in 
charge was still in Africa. Thus Augustine was not sure who would take the 
chair in the trial and wrote them both.50 He was concerned about court proce-
dure and wanted to advise on the verdict. 
 
 
2.3. Augustine’s Arrogation of Authority 
 
Of course, other than with the habit of the church whose admonition should 
show clemency, the governance over a province had to be carried out with se-
verity. Augustine acknowledged this: sed alia causa est provinciae, alia est 
ecclesiae, illius terribiliter gerenda est administratio, huius clementer 
commendanda est mansuetudo. Were Apringius not a good Christian, 
Augustine would still defend the interest of the church and argue that the acts 
against servants of God should remain beneficial in the sense that the victims 
stand out as examples of patience (exempla patientiae) and that the church 
should not therefore be remembered in connection with vengeance; their blood 
should not be mixed with the blood of their enemies.51 If Apringius did not 
yield, Augustine continues, he would suspect him of hostility. Thus implicitly 
argued, a hostile judge could not be impartial. Augustine explicitly requests the 
imperial judges to add his letters to the protocol of the proceedings and so ap-
pears to be prepared to take the case to the emperor’s own council.52 “We act 
                                                 
49 Cf. Cod. Theod. 16, 5, 52. For more detail see W.H. FREND, The Donatist Church, Clarendon Press, Ox-
ford 1952, 289ff. 
50 See AUG. Ep. 139 (to Marcellinus, CSEL 44, 148-154); 133 (to Marcellinus, CSEL 44, 80-84), 134 (to 
Apringius, CSEL 44, 84-88); the proconsul of Africa decided vice sacra, in the emperor’s place, see PIELER, 
Gerichtsbarkeit, 430, 438.  
51 See AUG. Ep. 134, 3 (CSEL 44, 86). He repeated this in letter 139, 2 (CSEL 44, 150) to Marcellinus: propter 
conscientiam nostram et propter catholicam mansuetudinem commendandam; Augustine was afraid that the 
Donatists would celebrate themselves as martyrs for their religious cause (see endnote 28 above). In case of 
murder the death penalty was prescribed, see Th. MOMMSEN, Römisches Strafrecht, Leipzig, 1899, 632. In the 
pursuance of the Donatists as heretics, the death penalty was never intended, but the supplicium justae animad-
versarionis of Cod. Theod. 16, 5, 41 and 44 bore the interpretation of death in the view of proconsul Donatus 
in 408. See AUG. Ep. 100 to Donatus (CSEL 34,535-538) and FREND, The Donatist Church, 189, 271; differ-
ently: MCLYNN, Augustine’s Roman Empire, 40, who holds that Augustine is hypothetical and only wants to 
pump information on further enforcement of heresy laws. Working in the mines was another option, see 
STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, Problems, vol II, 170; A. HOULOU, Le droit pénal chez St. Augustin, «Revue histori-
que de Droit français et étranger», 4th s., 52 (1974), 5-29. 
52 Etiam gestis iubete allegari epistulas meas (AUG. Ep. 139, 2, CSEL 44, 151). He is explicit in this regard in this 
letter to Marcellinus: should his brother support the death penalty he should at least leave the convicted in 
custody until Augustine asked the emperor for clemency, ut in custodiam recipiantur, atque hoc de clementia 
imperatorum impetrare curabimus. On the importance of ‘acts’ see DOYLE, Bishop as Disciplinarian, 91-98, 
but especially J. SCHEELE, Buch und Bibliothek, «Bibliothek und Wissenschaft», 12 (1978), 40, 79f. and A. 
STEINWENTER, Beiträge zum öffentlichen Urkundenwesen der Römer, Moser, Graz 1915, 12, 27ff. 
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within the limits of our episcopal power when we threaten a person at times 
with the judgement of men but most of all and always with the judgment of 
God”, he would write a few years later to Macedonius, then the vicarius Afri-
cae.53 
Augustine demands to have a say in the issue: firstly the church could not be 
held responsible in case the accused were killed, since she did not indict them 
for the deeds. He often stressed the obligation not to accuse. Christian moral 
forbade it. Repeatedly Augustine complained about people taking advantage of 
this reluctance to hand over offenders.54 Instead the accusations here had been 
made by officials, maybe defensores civitatis.55 But since the victims were ser-
vants of God, Augustine is very clear: “we do not want the sufferings of the ser-
vants of God to be avenged by punishments equal to those sufferings”.56 The 
defensor civitatis was a new development in criminal law. Originally the initia-
tive of a trial had lain with the victim, the person involved.57 Augustine thus uses 
a promising forensic trick. Although the iurisdictio was in the hands of the mag-
istrate, the fact that his action depended on somebody’s accusation, resulted in 
Augustine’s argument that he should be referring to the victim’s interest, which 
in this case was the church. 
Secondly he reminds Marcellinus of his duty and mission: he had come to 
Africa for the benefit of the Catholic cause. Augustine subtly commands re-
gional authority to testify and decide about the content of this benefit, since he 
was the responsible churchman in Hippo, where the crimes had transpired.58 If 
this reminder did not show enough power of persuasion he lastly orders it as 
                                                 
53 AUG. Ep. 153, 21 (CSEL 44, 420f): Agimus quantum episcopalis facultas datur, et humanum quidem 
nonnunquam, sed maxime ac semper divinum judicium comminantes. 
54 See below, § 3.3.2, AUG. Ep. 9* and Ep. 22*, 3. This was an ongoing theme that even the emperor referred 
to, e.g. in Const. Sirmond. 14 of 409 (in Theodosiani Libri XVI cum Constitutionibus Sirmondianis, ed. Th. 
MOMMSEN, Weidmann, Berlin 1962, 1st ed. 1904, 919): ut hac saltem ratione, quod agi adversum se per epis-
copum non posse confidit, at aliorum accusationibus malorum audacia pertimescat. For the context see J.F. 
MATTHEWS, Laying down the Law: A Study of the Theodosian Code, Yale University Press, New Haven 2000, 
121ff., 151-155; also HERMANOWICZ, Catholic Bishops, 505ff. (though I disagree on how she links the constitu-
tions’ expressed wish not to torture innocents (sine innocentium laesione, ibid., 918) to the “emperor’s violent 
judgement” (497) and the light she casts on Augustine’s letter exchange with Nectarius (Ep. 90; 91; 104; 105). 
55 Quia non accusantibus nostris sed illorum notoria ad quos tuendae publicae pacis vigilantia pertinebat (AUG. 
Ep. 133, 1, CSEL 44, 81). In AUG. Ep. 134, 2, they are the preservers of public security, cura eorum, qui disci-
plinae publicae inserviunt (CSEL 44, 85). Cf. E. BERNEKER’s article Defensor civitatis, in Reallexikon für Anti-
ke und Christentum, vol. III (1957), 649-656 and S. LANCEL’s one in Augustinus-Lexikon, vol. II (1996-2002), 
261-262. 
56 Nolumus tamen passiones servorum dei quasi vice talionibus paribus suppliciis vindicari (AUG. Ep. 133, 1, 
CSEL 44, 81). 
57 On the usual subscriptio in crimen see A. NOGRADY, Römisches Strafrecht nach Ulpian. Buch 7-9 De officio 
proconsulis, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2006, 76ff. 
58 Ut modum dispensationis meae non supergredi videar (AUG. Ep. 133, 3, CSEL 44, 83). 
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bishop to his Christian son.59 With a Christian judge, he concludes the matter 
more diplomatically with Apringius, he dealt otherwise; they pursued the same 
interest. A fellow-Christian with Augustine, Apringius had the judicial authority 
that Augustine lacked, so there should be no question but that he would extend 
his hand to help of the church.60 
 
 
2.4. The Manner in Which to Conduct the “cognitio” 
 
Concerning the procedure of investigation, the Christian judge should use his 
authority restrictedly: only clubbing, not torturing during the investigation and 
not using his power to full in his judgement, but yielding to the gentler sen-
tence.61 Marcellinus had already been mild in his inquisition. He had succeeded 
by using ‘only’ rods for beatings to get confessions. Augustine approves since he 
says that this was done frequently even in episcopal courts.62 Augustine asks the 
judge to be strict in his inquisition in order then to have the opportunity to dis-
play gentleness and pardon. It sufficed to display power in the inquisition.63 
Only the observance of the correct procedure allowed mild punishment: “do 
not imagine either that, while you have a duty to exercise mercy, judgement is 
                                                 
59 “…if listening to a friend begging or a bishop giving advice would not suffice” (AUG. Ep. 133, 3, CSEL 44, 
83f); see Ep. 134, 1 (CSEL 44, 84f). 
60 See AUG. Ep. 134, 3 (CSEL 44, 86): Subdatur sublimitas tua, subdatur fides tua; causam tecum tracto 
communem, sed tu in ea potes, quod ergo non possum; confer nobiscum consilium et porrige auxilium; and 
Ep. 134, 2: Christianus judicem rogo, et christianum episcopus moneo. Cf. Civ. V, 24: the Christian rulers are 
to “make their power the handmaid of his majesty by using it to spread his worship to the greatest possible 
extent” (P. WEITHMAN, Augustine’s political philosophy, in E. STUMP, ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
Augustine, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, 246). 
61 See AUG. Ep. 133, 1 (noli perdere paternam diligentiam) to Marcellinus, but also Ep. 134; 153; 139,2; simi-
larly in Ep. 100 to Donatus, the Christian and African proconsul of 408 (see endnotes 50 and 51 above). 
62 See AUG. Ep. 133, 2 (CSEL 44,82), where he enumerated the customs. Marcellinus had succeeded “not by 
limbs stretched upon the rack, not by iron claws furrowing the flesh, not by burning with the flames, but” — and 
Augustine approved — “by a beating from rods – a form of restraint that is customarily practised by teachers of 
the liberal arts, by parents themselves, and often even by bishops in their courts.” (non extendente eculeo, non 
sulcantibus ungulis, non urentibus flammis, sed virgarum verberibus eruisti. qui modus cohercitionis et a 
magistris artium liberalium, et ab ipsis parentibus, et saepe etiam in iudiciis solet ab episcopis hiberi). On the 
daily use of torture and the “powerful mental impact” of it, revealed in dreams see SHAW, Judicial Nightmares, 
539 ff., who refers e.g. to SEN. Ep. 14, 2; CYPR. Ad Donatum 10 and AUG. S. 161, 6 (PL 38, 880); 308, 5 (PL 
39, 1408-1410). 
63 In his City of God (XIX, 6) Augustine had a much darker view: there the judges could not look into the heart 
of the truth; therefore they had to load guilt upon themselves and torture the accused and witnesses. In legal 
practice however Augustine was more of an optimist and believed in the prudent judge who powerfully exam-
ined using “only” the rod and thereby succeeded in matters of procedural justice. He was constantly repeating 
this in his defence of the verdict against the Donatists, a case where everything had been pursued with such 
diligence and brought to light with such diligence, post causam tam diligenter actam et tam diligenter manifesta-
tam (AUG. Ep. 141, 13, CSEL 44, 246). 
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no affair of yours”64 and as important as display of power was: “do not, now that 
the crime has been discovered, look for an executioner, since in its discovery 
you were unwilling to use a torturer.”65 
 
 
2.5. The Verdict in a Criminal Case 
 
Augustine argues cautiously; he would not have the judges expand their author-
ity unlawfully. He did not demand a privilege for the church, he says, since he 
believed that judges were generally permitted to alleviate the penalty.66 
Augustine is unaware of the source of this custom (he just often heard): in his 
opinion it was in the power of the judge to mitigate the sentence and to punish 
more leniently than the laws commanded, soleo enim audire in potestate esse 
iudicis mollire sententiam et mitius vindicare quam leges.67 Laws against Do-
natism did not foresee the death penalty, but in cases of violentia and murder 
clearly the death penalty was prescribed. Yet who would register an appeal 
against a less fatal judgement? The interested party, the church in any case 
would not.68 So Augustine’s assumption seemed practical and carried weight.69 
The Christian judge in particular was to use his power to punish in a gentle, fa-
therly way; he should be loving yet strict, always with an eye to the opportunity 
for the convicted to be healed and to do penance, paenitendi medicina.70 In-
                                                 
64 AUG. En. Ps. 32/2, 12 (CCL 39, 256): Ne putes quod ad te misericordia pertineat, iudicium autem ad te non 
pertineat. 
65 Noli facinore invento quaerere percussorem, in quo inveniendo noluisti tortorem (AUG. Ep. 133, 2, CSEL 44, 
83).  
66 Quod licet iudicibus facere etiam non in causis ecclesiae (AUG. Ep. 134, 4, CSEL 44, 87). 
67 AUG. Ep. 139, 2 (CSEL 44, 151). 
68 Augustine’s caution resulted from previous defeat, when upon the appeal of the convicted Donatist Cripinus 
the emperor had fined the judges who had granted mercy upon his request to waive Crispinus’ fine. The fines 
for the judges were eventually revoked, but it must have left a sour taste in the mouths of African administrators; 
cf. MCLYNN, Augustine’s Roman Empire, 53f.; HERMANOWICZ, Catholic Bishops, 496. 
69 See B. HECHT, Störungen der Rechtslage in den Relationen des Symmachus. Verwaltung und Rechtspre-
chung in Rom 384 /385 n. Chr., Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2006, 564f. E. Levy is pessimistic on Augustine’s 
guess: see his Gesetz und Richter, 501. Yet the lawyer Hermogenian whose work was absorbed by African ju-
risprudence had written long ago in his iuris epitomae (Dig. 48, 19, 42): Interpretatione legum poenae 
molliendae sunt potius quam asperandae (“In the interpretation of the statutes punishments should be mitigated 
rather than made harsher”). Cf. D. LIEBS, Hermogenians Iuris Epitomae. Zum Stand der römischen Jurispru-
denz im Zeitalter Diokletians, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1964, 73f; Römische Jurisprudenz in Afri-
ca mit Studien zu den pseudopaulinischen Sentenzen, 2. Auflage, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2005, 106; E. 
DOVERE, De iure. L’esordio delle epitomi di Ermogeniano, Jovene, Napoli 20052, 141-86. On the liberty of the 
judge cf. also endnote 40 above. 
70 Augustine compares the death penalty with the — in his view — outdated law of retaliation of the Old Testa-
ment, requiring an eye for an eye. See AUG. Ep. 134, 2 to Apringius (CSEL 44, 85): ut eis paria non 
retribuantur, quamquam lapidis ictibus digitum praecidere oculumque convellere leges puniendo non possint. 
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stead of being killed, convicted persons should be put to some useful work.71 
This mildness was an obligation, because the Christian judge would have to give 
account of his doings before God’s tribunal.72 
 
 
2.6. The Formula for Civil Affairs 
 
In civil matters Augustine equally asks for a judge’s impartiality: “Be just even 
when the rich has a sound case: you sometimes have to decide against the poor. 
Then would-be kindness was not asked for. You were not to play down the 
poor person’s wrongdoing and make his case better than it was and, upon being 
disapproved of, excuse yourself with merciful motivation”.73 Augustine sticks 
close to worldly rules and arrives at the divine solution in a second step: “hold 
tight to both mercy and judgment”. It would do no good to be an accomplice to 
someone’s dishonesty, because then “he left your presence unjustly assisted, 
and remained in God’s presence justly condemned.”74 Other than Ambrose, 
Augustine proposes a strategy to which modern mediation management would 
eagerly subscribe; treat them justly and then give them the opportunity to grant 
mercy, thus wheedle them into being charitable out of their own choice; in this 
fashion vera iustitia and caritas could be generated: 
 
Iudicares primo secundum causam, argueres pauperem, flecteres divitem. 
Alius est iudicandi, alius petendi locus. Quando te ille dives videret tenuisse 
iustitiam, non exercisse iniqui pauperis cervicem, sed pro merito peccati sui 
obiurgasse te iuste, nonne flecteretur ill ad misericordiam petente te, qui 
laetus redditus erat iudicante te? (En. Ps. 32/2, 12, CCL 39, 257) 
 
You should have given judgment on the merits of the case, and convicted 
the poor person, and then sought to mollify the rich man. There is a right 
place for judging, and a different place for making an appeal for clemency. If 
the rich litigant had watched you holding fast to justice, and giving no prefer-
ence to a dishonest poor man, but justly finding him guilty as his crime de-
served, would not that rich claimant have been inclined to mercy at your peti-
                                                 
71 Cf. MOMMSEN, Römisches Strafrecht, 949ff. Working in the mines was the heaviest punishment after the 
death penalty, there were other harsh sentences, for instance one could be made into a state slave: for life (cf. 
endnote 51 above). 
72 Non dubito in hac potestate, quam tibi deus homini in homines dedit, cogitre te divinum iudicium, ubi et 
iudice stabunt rationem de suo iudicio reddituri, he writes to Marcellinus’ brother, the proconsul and judge in 
the trials against the Donatists, also at the end of 411 (AUG. Ep. 134, CSEL 44, 85). 
73 AUG. En. Ps. 32/2, 12 (CCL 39, 256). 
74 AUG. En. Ps. 32/2, 12 (CCL 39, 257): A te recessit iniuste adiutus, Deo remansit iuste damnandus. 
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tion, as he had been rendered happy at your judgement? (transl. by M. 
Boulding) 
 
The outcome of this cursory investigation is intriguing: Augustine was ready 
to take a judge’s verdict to a court of appeal. Using the tools at hand he insisted 
on correct judgment according to procedure.75 Augustine argued how capital 
punishment damaged the image of the church and since the victims were clerics 
his opinion had to be taken into consideration. However, his emphasis lay 
mostly on the highest court of appeal: that of God himself. To him the judges 
were responsible. Nevertheless, Augustine stressed the importance of accurate 
application of the constitutiones principum and the observation of the correct 
procedure.76 Not only did judgement have to follow investigation; but the state-
ments lodged on behalf of the church needed to be collected with protocol. 
The bishop insisted on the judge’s impartiality and his modest application of 
punishment. He claimed a judge’s moral integrity and called attention to his 
high responsibility in using the laws that had granted him the earthly power to 
judge. Augustine’s way of thinking amounted to the equating of “law-abiding” 
and “Christian”. A famous imperial officer and lawyer of the early third century 
proudly construed his legal activity thus: 
 
Iuri operam prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris descendat. Est autem 
a iustitia appellatum. Nam, ut eleganter Celsus definit, ius est ars boni et 
aequi. Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet. Iustitiam namque colimus 
et boni et aequi notitiam profitemur, aequum ab iniquo separantes, licitum 
ab illicito discernentes, bonos non solum metu poenarum, verum etiam 
praemiorum exhortatione efficere cupientes, veram nisi fallor philosophiam, 
non simulatam affectantes. (Ulpianus, Dig. 1, 1, 10) 
 
The person who engages himself in legal matters, has to know first, where 
the name of law is derived from. Namely it’s called after justice. For, as Cel-
sus elegantly defined it: law is the art of the good and the fair. In this regard 
one should call us priests. For we supply the service of justice and declare the 
                                                 
75 HERMANOWICZ, Catholic Bishops, e.g. 482 and 494, perceives appeals to the emperor to be the often used 
yet double-edged instrument of the African bishops concerning local politics. 
76 When Augustine interceded on behalf of the farmer Faventius, he was preoccupied lest the money of the 
wealthy opponent might prevail in court. Faventius, a tenant farmer, had been taken in custody in inappropriate 
manner. Further he had not been granted the legally provided postponement to prepare his case. Instead he 
had been lead by force to Generosus, then governor of Numidia. Augustine emphasized the fact that laws had 
been violated and asked the governor to be not only an upright, but also a Christian judge and therefore to grant 
a delay. See AUG. Ep. 113-116, especially 115 to the bishop colleague and 116 to Generosus, where he de-
manded: Et profecto facies quod non solum integrum, verum etiam christianum judicem decet (AUG. Ep. 116, 
CSEL 34/1, 663). Concerning the decision about punishment: in Ep. 104, 17 Augustine distinguishes the differ-
ent levels of guilt and holds that mercy should follow only after a neat verdict. On “reserved mildness” see also 
Ep. 91, 10 or Ep. 95, 4. 
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knowledge of the good and fair, separating equity from iniquity, discerning 
the permitted and prohibited and desiring to encourage to do good not only 
through fear of punishment, but through exhortation with awards, striving for 
– if I am not mistaken – the true wisdom not for her simulation.77 
 
Given Augustine’s advice for the judges, he would probably subscribe to this 
confident description. He would agree on the mixture of fear of punishment 
and exhortation. Only it would not be an art of the good and fair alone, but 
god-given wisdom as well as sense for Christian charity. Like the lawyer Ulpian, 
Augustine requested to be heard and was conscious of his knowledge of the (di-
vine) law. Vera philosophia had become vera iustitia dei to the African bishop. 
Augustine was convinced of his own ability to know about law and justice. 
 
 
3. The Bishop As Judge and Arbitrator78 
 
3.1. Augustine As Episcopal Judge 
 
Late antiquity witnessed the Christian bishop as responsible for the church’s 
discipline. Scripture commanded the Christians to settle their disputes amongst 
themselves. When following imperial decrees a bishop was put in charge by the 
consent of litigating parties. Other than were the civil judges, he was more at 
liberty how to decide, because arbitration before the episcopal judge could not 
be appealed; there was no need to decide according to worldly regulations. De-
cisions of the episcopal arbitrator abided because of the mutual agreement of 
the two parties that had chosen the bishop as their judge.79 He had to arbitrate 
in their place and for them find a just solution and so serve up justice. 
Augustine’s perception of his office as judge was closely linked to his duty as 
leader of his congregation: “I nourish you with what nourishes me, I offer you 
                                                 
77 Cf. LIEBS, Römisches Recht, 61f. 
78 From the church’s point of view the bishop could be called judge. From an outsider’s view, e.g. the imperial 
regime, the bishop was an arbitrator since he had to be put in charge by the consent of the litigating parties. Cf. 
M. KASER - K. HACKL, Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, Beck, München 19962, 641 f. (§ 100 III) on a short 
period in the fourth century where bishops might have been judges, though W. SELB, «Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung», 84 (1967) 162-217, esp. 195 considers Const. Sir-
mond.. 1 (from 333) not reliable. Cf. also M.R. CIMMA, L’Episcopalis audientia nelle costituzioni imperali da 
Costantino a Giustiniano, Giappichelli, Torino 1989, 40ff., 62ff. For newer research that draws together some 
of the different interpretations you could refer to O. HUCK, À propos de CTh 1,27,1 et CSirm 1, «Zeitschrift 
der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung», 120 (2003), 78-105; on the distinctions of 
arbiter and iudex very useful J. HARRIES, Creating Legal Space: Settling Disputes in the Roman Empire, in C. 
HEZSER (ed.), Rabbinic Law in its Roman and Near Eastern, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2003, 63-81. 
79 Cf. J. GAUDEMET, L’Église dans l’empire romain, Sirey, Paris 1958, 235f., concluding: “Ainsi dès l’époque du 
Code Théodosien, la jurisdiction épiscopale en matière civile n’éxistait plus que sous forme d’un arbitrage inter 
volentes.”; differently G. VISMARA, La giurisdizione civile dei vescovi (secoli I-IX), Giuffrè, Milano 1995, 109. 
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what I live on myself … I feed you on what I am fed on myself set food before 
you from the pantry which I too live on, from the lord’s storerooms”, he told 
his listeners.80 He never ceased to tell, how the office was to him a burdensome 
and dangerous responsibility; the dominance it gave might weaken the demand 
of modesty, humilitas, and service for the task. In Christ’s team of good pastors 
the bishop was to call his flock which would follow his commands.81 Of course 
as no less burdensome he perceived his duty to sit in the episcopal court. 
From an observer’s point of view, his close friend and colleague Possidius 
portrayed Augustine’s judicial activities modelled on the strong ideals of educa-
tional authority and wisdom applied to service of the church.82 Concerning court 
procedure, Augustine was aware of being in a tricky position, since whoever de-
cided against a friend was likely to lose one.83 Depicting his late friend with con-
scious emphasis less as the “holy wise man”, but more as “example inviting imi-
tation”,84 Possidius accentuated Augustine’s pastoral, administrative and forensic 
activities. He remembered him as working quite hard: “Often he remained 
without food until midday, sometimes the whole day, always examining and ar-
bitrating, focusing on the state of their Christian souls, how much someone ad-
vanced in his faith and good manners or retreated from them”.85 The order of 
procedure is again essential: Augustine usually examined (noscebat) and then 
arbitrated (dirimebat); on the basis of the results he came to his verdicts. Chris-
tian attitude and morality of the parties had a major impact, Possidius stated. 
Through the study of Scriptures the bishop acquired judgments “regarding the 
Christian soul”.86 However this was not always the main issue in the process of 
                                                 
80 AUG. S. 339, 4 = S. Frangip. 2 (ed. G. Morin in Sancti Augustini Sermones post Maurinos reperti, Typ. 
Polygl. Vaticanis, Roma 1930, 193): inde pasco, unde pascor …. inde vobis appono, unde ego vivo, de thesauro 
dominico. 
81 Cf. F. BELLENTANI, “Episcopus ... est nomen suspecti officii: Il vocabolario del servizio episcopale in alcuni 
testi agostiniani, in Vescovi e pastori in epoca teodosiana. In occasione del XVI centenario della consacrazione 
episcopale di S. Agostino, 396-1996. XXV Incontro di studiosi dell’antichità cristiana. Roma, 8-11 maggio 1996, 
vol. I (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 58), Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 1997, 667-682. 
82 Cf. E. ELM, Die Macht der Weisheit. Das Bild des Bischofs in der Vita Augustini des Possidius und anderen 
spätantiken und frühmittelalterlichen Bischofsviten, Brill, Leiden 2003, esp. 100-159. Possidius was throughout 
his biography concerned with refuting criticism that Augustine had been arrogant in his early days. See ELM, 
Die Macht, 125, about Augustine’s elections to become priest and bishop (cf. POSS. Vita Aug. 4, 1-3) At least to 
his opponents he seemed to have come across as sometimes a little proud. Cf. also L. HAMILTON, Possidius’ 
Augustine and Post-Augustinian Africa, «Journal of early Christian Studies, 12/1 (2004), 87, who emphasizes the 
factual accuracy of the Vita. 
83 Cf. POSS. Vita Aug. 19, 2 (ed. W. Geerlings in POSSIDIUS, Vita Augustini. Zweisprachige Ausgabe, Schö-
ningh, Paderborn etc. 2005, 64): de amicis vero unum esset, contra quem sententia proferretur, perditurus. 
84 ELM, Die Macht, 158; cf. also S. ELM, Der Asket. 
85 Et eas aliquando usque ad horam refectionis, aliquando autem tota die ieiunans, semper tamen noscebat et 
dirimebat: intendens in eis christianorum momenta animorum, quantum quisque vel in fide bonisque moribus 
proficeret, vel ab iis deficeret (POSS. Vita Aug. 19, 6, ed. Geerlings). 
86 This claim turns out to be true, since Augustine extensively quoted the Scriptures in his letters to officials, 
making it his most prominent source of reference. 
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arbitration: “And when he saw that circumstance gave the opportunity, then he 
taught the parties the truth of the divine law, inculcated them, admonished and 
instructed them, how they could attain eternal life.”87  
Augustine was settling worldly disputes according to worldly rules and only 
when opportune did he lecture on the wider, godlier aspects of the laws (divinae 
legis veritatem). As his written questions to the lawyer Eustochius show, he had 
a team of advisers for legal questions.88 And again this duty to judge according to 
temporal law he had gained from Paul, 1 Cor. 6,1-6: 
 
Quoniam ergo praecepit apostolus, ut saecularia iudicia si inter se 
habuerint christiani, ea non in foro, sed in ecclesia fiant, unde nos necesse est 
perpeti tales iurgantium quaestiones, in quibus nobis etiam terrena iura 
quaerenda sint, praecipue de condicione hominum temporali. (Ep. 24*, 1, 
CSEL 88, 126) 
 
The apostle has commanded that, if Christians have with one another 
cases concerning worldly affairs that need adjudication, they should be heard 
in the church, not in the courts. For this reason we have to endure the sort of 
petitions on the part of litigants in which we have to learn the laws of this 
world, especially concerning the temporal condition of persons. (transl. by R. 
Teske; my italics)89 
 
The attitude might explain the good reception he attained in his court. His 
courtroom was forever filling with people who expected a just decision that was 
free of charge and corruption; that is, they expected decisions unlike those of 
civil judges. He might have come across as incorruptible, diligently listening and 
gingerly deciding; it might have been a question of his personal charisma, but 
certainly his knowledge of the earthly rules could be relied on. Maybe they 
knew better what to expect, and so they traded in their possibility to appeal at 
the next instance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 POSS. Vita Aug. 19, 4 (ed. Geerlings): Atque compertis rerum opportunitatibus, divinae legis veritatem partes 
docebat, eamque illis inculcabat, et eas quo adipiscerentur vitam aeternam (Mc 10, 17) edocebat et admonebat: 
nihil aliud quaerens ab iis quibus ad hoc vacabat, nisi tantum obedientiam et devotionem christianam, quae et 
Deo debetur et hominibus: peccantes coram omnibus arguens, ut ceteri timorem haberent (1 Tim 5, 20). 
88 See Letter 24* (CSEL 88, 126f.), which Augustine wrote to the lawyer Eustochius in the early fifth century. 
Probably a provincial lawyer, Eustochius, was frequently consulted by Augustine; see LIEBS, Römische Juris-
prudenz, 34f.  
89 It is remarkable that he also founds the legitimacy of an individual law on the Scriptures, when he continues in 
Ep. 24*: quod possumus secundum apostolicam disciplinam, ut dominis suis sint subditi, servis praecipere. 
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3.2. Augustine’s Dealing with the Ignorant Bishop Victor, Ep. 8* 
 
Even a Non-Christian might have had higher hopes to get what he wanted and 
to succeed in his cause, when referring to bishop Augustine instead of to ordi-
nary judges. Augustine’s handling of the complaint of the Jew Licinius shows 
what he expected of his own colleague-bishops. It was not so opportune to 
teach Licinius the Jew about God’s justice. Augustine rather rebuked one of his 
own colleagues, the seemingly arrogant bishop Victor, who was not such a 
model bishop after all: 
 
 
3.2.1. The Evidence 
 
The case was all to do with some little pieces of land, quos agellos.90 It seems 
they had formerly all belonged to the mother of the Jew Licinius. Apparently 
the mother was not on good terms with her son. Perhaps she had not been alto-
gether happy with his choice of wife. The son had bought the land from the 
people to whom his mother had previously sold it. He then had given part of it 
to his wife upon their marriage. The whole lot had been the object of a sale of 
the old lady again, as if she were the proprietor. But in truth now her son and 
his wife were the owners and in possession of it. Regardless, bishop Victor, the 
purchaser, forcefully took possession. When Licinius protested, Victor replied 
that he had bought it from his mother. Licinius should argue with her and ask 
Victor for nothing, because Victor did not owe anything: Ego emi si male mihi 
vendidit mater tua, cum ipsa litiga! A me noli aliquid quaerere, quia nihil tibi 
debeo. So Licinius turned to Augustine for help. 
Licinius’s documents had proven the complaint well founded and hence had 
convinced Augustine. His memorandum to Victor provides evidence for 
Augustine’s high regard and knowledge of property law: he reproaches bishop 
Victor for severe ignorance of the laws (ignorantiam iuris) and sets the issues 
right. 
 
 
3.2.2. The Law of Sale and Augustine’s Directive 
 
It had been wrong of Victor to have driven Licinius away from his possession 
forcefully. There was no possibility whatsoever of somebody to be rightfully ex-
cluded from possession: Licinius had the better right (optimo iure) because of 
his possession. Victor could not buy the land from the mother, if her son had it 
in his possession. She could not rightfully have sold, what did not belong to her, 
                                                 
90 AUG. Ep. 8* (CSEL 88, 41-42). 
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even if by some fault she deserved to have the land (etiamsi forte ei aliquid 
competebat). This meant that she had first to win it back from Licinius in court 
and only then could she have sold it, after receiving it back. What concerns 
Licinius, according to Augustine, he would be well advised to go to court with 
an actio in rem to regain his possession. And of course this action would be di-
rected not against his mother, but rather against the one who forcefully took 
over possession; a legal procedure Augustine in no way wanted his colleague to 
be seen involved. All this behaviour, concludes Augustine, was altogether revolt-
ing and unfitting to Victor’s way of life, valde invidiosum est et a tuis moribus 
alienum. 
In moral matters a bishop was not to appear weak. He should be an exam-
ple of honesty and righteousness, unworthy of physical force and ignorant arro-
gance toward others, especially towards a Jew.91 He commands Victor to behave 
according to his advice. It was obligatory for Victor to give back the little estate. 
His money he could only retrieve from the mother, were it paid, adds 
Augustine as if he doubted even that. But if it had been paid and she did not 
give the sum back, again: such behaviour would not cause Licinius to lose his 
property. He could not lose it, nec ita iste rem suam perdere non potuit. And 
to stress it, he distinguishes between justice and the worldly laws, subtly setting 
the priorities. The laws on property happened to be in accord with the divine 
and with justice; Victor had to give back the estates because his action contra-
dicted what justice demanded and the laws cried for, necesse est enim ut eam 
recipiat intercedente iustitia clamantibus legibus. Ultimately he refers to the 
word of the Apostle and cites 1 Cor 10,32: no offence should be given to the 
Jews or the Greeks nor to the church – a passage that preaches respect and in a 
way tolerance.92 Better for Victor thus to do what was just, rather than to risk 
trial before an episcopal court, Melius est autem, ut a tuo carissimo fratre 
commonitus facias quod iustum est, quam ut ista causa veniat ad episcopale 
iudicium. 
Augustine was right about the legal situation. What Victor had done could 
not be upheld. A sales contract was valid only in written form. For fiscal reasons 
                                                 
91 “… give, but not give what belongs to someone else” (Dicit tibi deus: Stulte, jussi dares, sed non de alieno). See 
AUG. S. 178, 4 (PL 38, 962): Sed ait mihi raptor rerum alienarum: Ego similis illius divitis non sum. Agapes 
facio, vinctis in carcere victum mitto, nudos vestio, peregrinos suscipio. Dare te putas? Tollere noli, et dedisti. 
Cui dederis, gaudet, Cui abstuleris, plorat: quem duorum istorum exauditurus est Dominus? (“But the plun-
derer of other people’s property says to me, “I’m not like that rich man. I provide ‘agape meals’, I send food to 
those chained up in prison, I clothe the naked, I welcome strangers.” Do you really imagine you are giving? 
Stop grabbing, an then you have really given. The person you’ve given something to, rejoices, the one you’ve 
snatched something from is crying; which of these two is the Lord going to listen to? …”; transl. E. Hill). 
92 On Augustine and the Jews see B. BLUMENKRANZ, Augustin et le judaisme, in Recherches Augustiniennes, 
vol. I (1958), 225-240 (repr. in B. BLUMENKRANZ, Juifs et Chrétiens. Patristique et Moyen Age, Variorum 
Reprints, London 1977, nr. III). In Hippo there was a Jewish community as well as in Carthage, where 
Augustine often went – the biggest Jewish community in Africa was there (see ibid., 226). 
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the purchaser had to acknowledge his duty to pay taxes.93 This might be how 
Licinius confirmed his right of ownership. Property was the real, not negotiable 
dominion over the land.94 Victor could not take the land by force. Not only was 
Augustine right about Licinius’ possibility to be successful with an actio in rem, 
but he was also (and maybe strategically?) silent about something far graver: the 
forceful invasion of land could be capitally punished in a criminal trial.95 Had it 
not been for the involvement of his mother, Licinius might and could have pur-
sued this possibility.96 
 
 
3.2.3. The “episcopale iudicium” 
 
With his reference to the episcopale iudicium Augustine meant an episcopal 
court that might deprive Victor of his office owing to such behaviour.97 The 
bishop of Hippo can be depicted as diplomat, juggling the opportunities, yet 
harshly reproaching his colleague, with full awareness of the implications e.g. 
that there was danger of a dispute outside a bishop’s court and thus a challenge 
to Victor’s career. A verdict outside the church was not wished for, but it could 
happen. It could result in disciplinary trial against Victor in front of an episcopal 
court: at best he would be asked to do penance. At worst he would be perma-
nently deprived of his office as bishop.98 
                                                 
93 Constantine ordered this in 337, see Vat. 35, 3-5 = Cod. Theod. 3, 1, 2; M. KASER, Das Römische Privat-
recht, 2. Abschnitt, Beck, München 1959, 199 (§ 242 III 1). 
94 Augustine is referring to possessio only. Recently on the distinction between possession and dominion in the 
Theodosian Code and against the theory of Vulgar law that meddled the terms, cf. S. VANDENDRIESSCHE, 
Possessio und dominium im postklassischen römischen Rechts, Verlag Dr. Kovač, Hamburg 2006. 
95 HECHT, Störungen der Rechtslage, 566f. refers to Cod. Theod. 9, 10, 2 of 317: Si quis per violentiam 
alienum fundum invaserit, capite puniatur, but the alleged self-help could protect against such a punishment, 
Cod. Theod. 9, 10, 3 or Cod. Theod. 11, 36, 1, 4. Cod. Theod. 9, 10, 4 of 390 and Cod. Theod. 2, 4, 5 of 389 
show, that the problems arose mainly in Africa (see Hecht, Störungen der Rechtslage, 567). 
96 On the privilegium fori, see endnote 97 below. 
97 Licinius probably did have the opportunity to take Victor to a civil court. This Augustine wanted to prevent. 
The discussion is on a law of 412 addressed to the Praetorian Prefect Melitius, Cod. Theod. 16, 2, 41. J. Rougé 
maintains that Licinius turned to Augustine because Victor was a bishop and the law of 412 contained a privi-
legium fori for bishops, which meant that they could not be called into civil court: see J. ROUGÉ, Escroquerie et 
brigandage en Afrique romaine au temps de saint Augustin (ep. 8* et 10*), in Les Lettres de Saint Augustin 
découvertes par Johannes Divjak. Communications présentées au colloque des 20 et 21 Septembre 1982, Étu-
des Augustiniennes, Paris 1983, 180f. This however is not the case. For the beginning of the fifth century such a 
privilegium did not exist. Similar to the restrictions of the episcopalis audientia after Julian the Apostate it was 
not granted and the Compilators of the Theodosian Code are referring to apud episcopos, si quidem alibi non 
oportet in the sense of ‘insofar as something else is not opportune’. Cf. also GAUDEMET, L’Église, 242f.; VIS-
MARA, Giurisdizione, 108ff. 
98 Cf. the measures taken against bishop Antoninus, a bird of the same feather, who robbed his town to build a 
villa for himself, Augustine’s letter to Fabiola, Ep. 20*; see S. LANCEL, L’affaire d’Antonius de Fussala, in Les 
Lettres, 267-285 ; Ch. MUNIER, La question des appels à Rome d’après la Lettre 20* d’Augustin, ibid., 187-
199. 
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3.2.4. Augustine’s Mediation 
 
The sale, which might not have been one, may have been a matter of simple 
avarice rather than an attempt to lend a strong hand to an elderly lady, as 
Augustine apologetically assumes. Thereby he prudently pampers the stubborn 
bishop into a deal already agreed to by Licinius. Augustine had succeeded in 
convincing Licinius of a settlement which could restore bishop Victor’s dignity. 
In exchange for restitution, bishop Victor should arbitrate the family issue.  
Augustine must have been sensitive to it; at the ‘heart of darkness’ there 
seemingly lay some fierce female brawl between mother and daughter-in-law. 
The mother must have been injured in a way, a victim of some offence by the 
wife or her servant; Licinius had been quite ignorant of and uninterested in the 
details so far. But Augustine had questioned the motivation his mother could 
have had for such behaviour. Licinius consequently had agreed to have the mat-
ter investigated and settled by bishop Victor. Victor may even himself beat 
Licinius with a rod, should his compliance in the offence be revealed. Other 
than that, it seems important only that the mother could be spectator of her 
son’s reproof or witness to the beating of the daughter-in-law or her servant, de-
pending on the outcome of the investigation. Augustine had secured Licinius’ 
consent to a trial before Victor’s court and now installed his colleague as judicial 
arbitrator on the condition of Victor’s most ardently advised return of the acres 
to their rightful owner. Victor has almost no option to behave otherwise. 
Licinius has his case and does not need to be reminded about divine law. But 
the bishop was not to be ignorant of the secular laws. It seems a fine solution of 
the problem for all, since Licinius might have had an interest in not having to 
stand in a Jewish trial, where the offence against a parent was more severely 
punished. The Old Testament foresaw the death penalty.99 So Licinius would 
be well served and needed no revenge like Shakespeare’s Shylock. His dignity 
would be preserved and his losses returned. But foremost Victor would be 
corrected and not be challenged in a trial before an ordinary court. It is crucial 
for Augustine that a bishop should not be a party to a trial in civil court. Even 
more importantly, a bishop was not to be seen robbing land for any reason. 
With a little help and instruction on procedure the damage to ecclesiastical 
authority might have been contained. Yet sadly the outcome of the affair cannot 
be tracked. 
                                                 
99 Ex. 21, 15 and 17 foresees the death penalty for insulting parents. 
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3.3. The Forming of Church Law Inspired by Imperial Ruling, Ep. 9* 
 
In a last example Augustine promotes imperial jurisprudence in the clerical 
sphere: “I do not know what to say if in ecclesiastical tribunals we do not pre-
serve the justice that the civil laws have most wisely established”.100 Augustine is 
unhappy about the Roman bishop’s failure to refer to the imperial leges 
temporales. Ep. 9* is a good example of how Augustine approved of worldly 
regulations concerning procedure and compliance with the law in a lawsuit. He 
wants them copied in the ecclesiastical sphere. 
 
 
 
3.3.1. The Evidence 
 
A vir honestus, member of the legal profession most likely, had abducted and 
taken with him, a nun to make her the “plaything of his debauchery”, ad 
ludibrium stupri de patria duxerat. This phrasing means that he – as they were 
not married and she had vowed abstinence – had dishonoured her, by taking 
her with him, be it with or without her consent.101 The clerics, who had traced 
and found him with her, maybe in a church,102 had obviously given him a good 
beating. 
In late antiquity social status and legal privilege were divided in society be-
tween more respectable and lower people, honestiores and humiliores. Mem-
bers of the provincial curiae for example or lawyers (as here) received better 
treatment especially in criminal procedure, where they were exempt from tor-
ture or beatings.103 Therefore unhappy about his treatment, the man had ap-
pealed to Pope Celestine (422-432) and had been granted a trial against the 
                                                 
100 AUG. Ep. 9*, 4 (CSEL 88, 43-45). 
101 Though Augustine uses the mild ‘duxerat’ instead of ‘abduxerat’, he is sure that she was forcefully subdued to 
the man’s lust: libidini suae subdere (AUG. Ep. 9*, 2, CSEL 88, 44). Cf. though A. PRIMMER’s hypothesis, (‘de 
patris abduxerat’?), Nachlese zur Textgestaltung, in Les Lettres, 64.Yet Lizzy Bennett’s young and silly sister 
Lydia had out of her own choice eloped with Mr. Wickham, also a “distressing event of a most alarming and 
serious nature” (J. AUSTEN, Pride and Prejudice (1813), Oxford University Press, London 1964, 261ff.). 
102 This is not obvious; it cannot be deduced from 9*, 2, but could from 9*, 3, where Augustine is shocked 
about malefactis nequissimorum hominum, quae in ecclesia nefandis ausibus perpetrant. See PRIMMER, Nach-
lese, 61-63. 
103 Cf. LIEBS, Römisches Recht, 64f.; in fact, the words cum honorem vel curiae vel fori habent, quem videtur 
habere iste de quo agitur (AUG. Ep. 9*,2, CSEL 88, 43-45) are a proof of Jones’ suspicion that the privilege 
included advocates (JONES, The Later Roman Empire, vol. I, 519). In late antiquity, as was the case formerly 
with all Roman citizens, the privileged were exempt from corporal punishment and could not be tortured in a 
trial. Later this was repeatedly granted to certain groups. An overview of the history of the privileges is provided 
by C. LEPELLEY in BA 46 B (Lettres 1*-29*, Nouvelle édition du texte critique et introduction par Johannes 
Divjak, Traduction et commentaire par divers auteurs, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1987), 462-465. 
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rough clerics before bishop Alypius’ court.104 Alypius was given papal order to 
investigate and then discipline the clerics for violating the privileged man. These 
developments did not much please Augustine. It gave him the occasion to ad-
vise his friend in charge who had asked his opinion on the quaestio iuris.105 
Augustine had already been interviewing a presbyter named Commodianus, 
allegedly involved in the case somehow, who had complained about the oncom-
ing trial to Augustine. The latter had questioned him about details, but Com-
modianus claimed to have seen nothing. Only responsible for the subordinate 
clerics involved, he had not been himself present at the scene of the beating. 
 
 
3.3.2. Augustine’s Assessment 
 
Firstly, Augustine did not see how Commodianus could be judged, since he had 
not taken part in the beating. Predominantly though, Augustine writes to 
Alypius, he was worried lest the other clerics should be punished and the ab-
ductor walk away unharmed. One is tempted to detect some trace of criticism 
of the worldly laws. For Augustine seems to be quite excited and annoyed that 
honesti homines might think they could have a licence to do whatever they 
pleased, just because they were legally granted the privilege not to be corporally 
punished: 
 
Nosti quemadmodum nos soleat quaestio ista conterere vel quomodo 
haec mala impunita salvo regimine ecclesiae relinquantur vel quomodo 
debeant ab ecclesia vindicari, quandoquidem leges publicas nequeant. (Ep. 
9*, 2, CSEL 88, 43) 
 
You know how this question tends to wear us down, that is how these 
evils remain unpunished were it not for their handling by the church or how 
the church should punish what the civil laws cannot punish. (my transl.) 
 
Looking closely though, one must conclude that Augustine is much more 
concerned with church procedure and the treatment of cases where somebody 
appeals with a false or incomplete story and consequently gets granted favours. 
True, Augustine does say that the civil laws were not useful: leges publicas ne-
queant. Yet civil laws might have covered the offence. Given the facts, a vir 
honestus might well be punished for the crime of stuprum (e.g.) and so lose his 
privileges once and for all in a trial before ordinary judges through the punish-
                                                 
104 One might ask why he did not complain to civil authority. Yet it seems the man did not think his chances to 
be so high there, given his behaviour that had caused the situation. 
105 Alypius had (in 427) just come back from a mission to Italy, where he had met Celestine. This explains why 
he, thus known, is put in charge; cf. A. GABILLON in BA 46 B, 461. 
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ment of infamia.106 Augustine himself is aware of this possibility, since he holds 
that he could not believe that clerics in defence of the Lord’s house were to be 
punished for doing something so much less than the civil laws provided for, 
incomparabiliter minus quam paretur legibus publicis, and he explains their 
alleged motivation in beating and his justification of it: “…in order that there 
might be something to fear on the part of those who have no fear that the 
bishop or clerics may bring the civil laws to bear against them.”107 
Augustine might think this particular case too weak a case to prove the crime 
that the curialis committed. His privilege guarded him against being tortured to 
confess his felony. But this upsetting outcome was not mainly due to lack of 
laws or due to privileges. Augustine criticizes the vicious people themselves, 
who were not to count on the church’s own policy and self-obligation not to ac-
cuse somebody before worldly tribunals, so that the death penalty and torture 
might be avoided and the accused person might have the opportunity to re-
pent.108 Augustine supported corporal punishment not so much because of the 
weakness of the civil laws, but rather because of their sometimes too harsh sanc-
tions; because of the fatal condition of men who could not live morally and who 
therefore sometimes violate the laws; and because of the paradoxical situation 
that the church who did not hold the means to take away positions and privi-
leges (nec nobis licet) had to watch quietly as she herself was offended. He sup-
ported the idea of releasing somebody unworthy of his office, as could be seen 
in Victor’s case. Likewise in Ep. 14* and 15* Augustine made sure that the 
landowner whom he had informed about a crime (the brutal rape of a nun) 
committed by one of his men, would not exceed Augustine’s advice and verdict 
and perchance might be so upset as to beat him badly. Since the man had done 
penance, removal from office was to be punishment enough. Thus the whole 
letter 9* can be read more like a critique of the rash and little reflected opinion 
of the Roman bishop and those who wanted the privileges of the honesti to be 
held high and who by and large opposed physical punishment in ecclesiastical 
matters. It was not earthly law that denied trial altogether, but the clerics who 
were reluctant to use the worldly courts. 
                                                 
106 This need not be a criminal trial for a civil court had provisions for this as well, actiones famosae, and could 
sentence dolus malus, furtum, rapina or iniuria with the sanction of infamia. See KASER - HACKL, Das römische 
Zivilprozessrecht, 208 (§ 28 III 3); and also M. KASER, Infamia und ignominia in den römischen Rechtsquel-
len, «Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung», 73 (1956), 272f. 
107 AUG. Ep. 9*, 3 (CSEL 88, 45): quod donec fiat, quae sententia proferenda sit adversus dei servos qui pro 
domini sui domo faciunt aliquid sceleratis incomparabiliter minus quam paretur legibus publicis, ut sit 
utcumque quod timeant qui easdem publicas leges contra se episcopis vel clericis moveri posse non timent, 
omnino non video. Cf. endnote 54 above. 
108 See § 2.5 above. 
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The discussion on corporal punishment in the clerical sphere does not seem 
new (soleat).109 Augustine is in favour of it, since he was at loss as to what else 
could be done, since nothing else could have an impact on them. They did not 
care about ecclesiastical excommunication since they either were not Christians 
nor Catholics or because they lived as if they were not: 
 
Si autem honores movent quos quisque gerit vel gessit in saeculo, nec 
ipsos nobis licet in peccatis talibus quicquam minuere vel auferre, ut per 
huiusmodi poenam malefaciendi licentia comprimatur in eis quos vincire seu 
verberare non possis. (Ep. 9*, 2, CSEL 88, 44) 
 
But if honours that anyone holds or has held in the world impress them, 
we are not permitted to lessen them or to take them away in the case of such 
sins in order that we might hold in check the license for wrongdoing on those 
persons whom you cannot jail or beat. (transl. by R. Teske) 
 
In this crucial passage, Augustine again refers to the fact that only imperial 
jurisdiction could take away the privileges, whereas ecclesiastical jurisdiction did 
not have these means. Apart from the Christian tools of reproof, excommunica-
tion and penance, the church could only in accordance with the two litigants 
pronounce a judgement that then would be enforced by the authorities.110 He 
regrets this. For people doing penance, removal from office sufficed. All 
Augustine’s interceding with the authorities was only to do with encouraging 
them to moderate corporeal punishment and to prevent death. Each person 
should be granted the possibility to do better. Since it was common and ap-
proved in an episcopal court to ‘moderately’ beat people, the restrictions the 
privileges imposed for the honesti bore heavily.111  
Obviously there were people in charge to prevent persons in the church 
from dancing. We know of a regulation that forbade dancing at weddings: cler-
ics had to leave immediately when the dancing began.112 Thus it is very likely 
                                                 
109 Cf. § 3.3.2 above. In the power-play between bishops and local administration during and following the 
Calama riots, HERMANOWICZ, Catholic Bishops, construes Possidius as demanding harsh legislation and as 
therein opposed to Augustine. Her interpretation of Ep. 95 (ibid., 511ff.) is for the most part convincing, but I 
do not think Augustine played upon Possidius’ impulsiveness. Augustine never “categorically excluded corpo-
real punishment” (ibid., 514), also not in Ep. 104, 5. Augustine opposes the death penalty and torture of inno-
cent people (Ep. 104, 17) but not beating in general (Ep. 8*; 9*). True though, Augustine might have feared 
that involving the emperor would make compulsory not only thorough examination but also firm judgement 
against the murderers of the Calama Christians, including inevitable death penalty in a murder trial (independ-
ent of the ruling in Const. Sirmond. 14. 
110 Cf. KASER - HACKL, Das römisches Zivilprozeßrecht, 642 f. = § 100 III. 
111 Cf. AUG. Ep. 8*; 133, 2. 
112 See Council of Laodicea, can. 53 and 54 in G.D. MANSI, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, 
Akademische Druck- und Verlags Anstalt, Paris-Leipzig 1901-27, vol. II, 572f. or C.H. TURNER, Ecclesiae 
Occidentalis Monumenta Iuris Antiquissima. Canonum et Conciliourm Graecorum Interpretationes Latinae, 
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that there existed also a prohibition of and sanction for dancing in the church. 
Arguing a minore ad maius, Augustine asks why the guardians of the church’s 
peace were allowed to use their means to prevent somebody from doing some-
thing far worse than dancing, i.e. subjecting to one’s lust someone vowed to ho-
liness.113 
A thorough investigation included the behaviour that brought about the beat-
ing and its evaluation, remarks Augustine, who wants to have the subject be 
taken up by a council that would come up with a coherent policy on beating in 
such cases; only a council would be able to deliver correct judgement.114 This 
policy then taken into account, it would remain to investigate whether the beat-
ing had exceeded the Christian demand for modesty.115 Were that not the mode 
of procedure, Augustine surely does not know “what sort of account of our 
judgements we are going to give to our Lord”.116 He obviously holds that there 
should be some wise canonical law-making on the matter. The responsibility 
should be in more than one bishop’s hand. Should all this effort fail, he re-
minds Alypius and thereby gives him another hint on how to defeat the (not so) 
honourable man: 
 
Aestimo autem illum in iudicio sanctitatis vestrae rem tam manifestam, id 
est factum suum quod in libello suo tacuit, negare non posse. Iam vero in ec-
clesiastici iudiciis si nec iustitia ista servatur quam providentissime constitue-
runt leges publicae ne quisquam facile per imperiale rescriptum inique pulse-
tur, ut beneficio careat nec ei sit impunitum quicumque in precibus quae im-
peratori dantur aliquid quod ad causam pertinere suppresserit, et iste qui hoc 
fecit in libello tam sanctae sedi traditio non solum non puniendus episcopis 
verum etiam vindicandus videtur, quid dicam nescio. (Ep. 9*, 4, CSEL 88, 
45) 
 
I think however, that in the tribunal of your Holiness he cannot deny so 
obvious a matter that is the fact that he remained silent about his behaviour 
in his complaint to the pope. Now I do not know what to say if in ecclesiasti-
cal tribunals we do not preserve the justice that the civil laws have most wisely 
______________________ 
vol. 2,3, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1939, 383-385; cf. also C. ANDRESEN, Altchristliche Kritik am Tanz, in H. 
FROHNES (ed.), Kirchengeschichte als Missionsgeschichte. Die Alte Kirche, vol. I, Kaiser, München 1974, 344-
376. 
113 See AUG. Ep. 9*, 2 (see endnote 101 above). 
114 See AUG. Ep. 9*, 2-3 (CSEL 88, 43f). 
115 The context of the whole letter suggests that Augustine’s interview with Commodianus had already had to do 
with the question of whether the clerics might have exercised excessive force and so exceeded the limits of 
Christian moderation. AUG. Ep. 9*, 4 (CSEL 88, 45): nisi forte qui hoc ei fecit mensuram christianae modera-
tionis excessit. I follow the very constructive yet little received analysis of PRIMMER, Nachlese. 
116 AUG. Ep. 9*, 3 (CSEL 88, 44): non sane video qualem rationem iudiciorum nostrorum simus nostro domino 
reddituri, referring to Mt 12, 36. 
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established so as to avoid having anyone brought to trial unjustly by means of 
an imperial rescript – I mean so that a man loses the favour he asked for and 
so that a person does not go unpunished if, in the petitions submitted to the 
emperor, he suppresses something that clearly pertains to his case. And I do 
not know what to say if the man who did this in the request he submitted to 
so holy a see is seen not only to escape punishment by the bishops but even 
to obtain reparation. (transl. by. R. Teske) 
 
Augustine refers to the ongoing legislation on the misuse of imperial re-
scripts. Most recently it had been decided that such deception should result in 
punishment, even in civil courts. The offender should not get anything: 
 
Etsi legibus consentaneum sacrum oraculum mendax precator attulerit, 
careat penitus impetratis et, si nimia mentientis invenitur improbitas, etiam 
severitati subiaceat iudicantis. (Cod. Iust. 1, 22, 5) 
 
If a mendacious petitioner should obtain an imperial rescript in confor-
mity with the laws, he shall not have the benefit of it; and where excessive 
perversity is found in his falsehoods, he shall also be abandoned to the sever-
ity of the judge.117 
 
Thus justice under clerical authority could not always be established by one 
‘wise man’ alone, but like the Emperor’s consilium of lawyers such as Ulpian, 
Augustine recommends the consensus iuris of a church Council on such deli-
cate questions. Guiding principles would have to be laid down, so that promi-
nent lawyer-bishops like Alypius were not left without direction in their query, 
let alone bishops of the calibre of a Victor. In his view, what had been providen-
tissime established by the civil laws, should be taken as reference. Experience 
gathered in civil law tradition could improve ecclesiastical struggle for fair pro-
cedure. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Despite his “pragmatic realism”118 that resulted in the acceptance of the Roman 
judicial and administrative apparatus and order, Augustine often found fault 
with the state of affairs. Yet to him, this fault was due mostly to the lack of con-
sequence, the lack of assertion and enforcement of temporal laws, even in the 
realm of the church. “Given what can be observed with regard to the structures 
                                                 
117 It was decreed in 426 in the West. For similar constitutions cf. C. LEPELLEY in BA 46 B, 463f. 
118 BÖCKENFÖRDE, Geschichte, 201. 
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of the imperial administrative and legal systems generally, the penchant for a 
systematic lack of well organized system should come as no surprise”: such is 
the analysis of a distinguished scholar of our days.119 Augustine, man of his 
times, perceived it less as lack of organization. From his less distanced point of 
view he saw it largely as failure of individuals. Much needed was commitment to 
stand up for and demand justice from an administrative body that permitted 
individual latitude with the laws, imperial or divine. 
But the judges for instance, to whom he had sent his letters on behalf of the 
Donatist murderers, fell themselves victim to the purge of Count Marinus in 
413. Marcellinus and Apringius were accused of being supporters of Heraclian. 
In vain Augustine hastened to Carthage and now used all his influence on their 
behalf. But they were beheaded, shortly after a summary trial on September 
13th. And it was Marinus’s ‘evil plan’: “Suddenly a messenger burst in upon us 
from whom we learnt that they were executed before we were able to ask the 
outcome of the hearing. … His plan was that they could in that way be snatched 
from the protection of the Church, if they were not merely executed immedi-
ately, but were executed in a quite place nearby.”120 
His realism had its roots in the observation and experience of a society 
which was not fully christianised in Augustine’s own sense and where issues 
were often left to run their course, despite the often “prudent provisions” of the 
worldly laws; where a bishop like Augustine was left waiting in the hall to be 
heard by some authority,121 where officials could easily be bribed, a verdict be 
                                                 
119 M. PEACHIN, Iudex vice Caesaris. Deputy Emperors and the Administration of Justice during the Principate, 
Steiner, Stuttgart 1996, 206 denies the possibility to apply Rawls’ concept of “formal justice” to the Roman 
society: “Needed would have been a thoroughgoing organization and oversight of the legal system; yet that, I 
suggest, was quite simply foreign to the imperial Roman way of governing. Indeed, my impression is that in 
Roman terms, the very set of conditions requisite for the attainment of justice and equity demanded precisely 
what Rawls’ scheme attempts to banish. Roman notions of iustitia and aequitas, insofar as we can determine 
these for the imperial epoch, rested largely upon a permanent systematic flexibility – an inherent absence of 
impartial and consistent administration of laws and institutions”. Slightly different HERMANOWICZ, Catholic 
Bishops, 520. I do not think the “same prerogative that allowed Augustine to appeal to the proconsul also gave 
latitude to the local magistrates”. This inappropriately mingles the distinct matters of ruling, prosecution of a 
crime and penalty. Augustine restricted himself to admonishing the judges to adhere to the laws; he was very 
cautious not to ask them to act opposite their duties (see § 2.5 above). 
120 AUG. Ep. 151, 6 (CSEL 44, 386f.), transl. by R. Teske; FREND, The Donatist Church, 293; MCLYNN, 
Augustine’s Roman Empire, 42f. 
121 In S. 302, 17 Augustine asked the congregation not to bother him with commands to intercede anymore, 
because he was not listened to, when he did so. C. LEPELLEY, Les cités de l’Afrique romaine au Bas-Empire, 
vol. I, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1981, 396f. thinks the sermon was preceded by an actual failure to achieve 
something and is testimony of the often little influence Augustine had. The sermon should probably be dated to 
around 412 (cf. P. HOMBERT, Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne, Institut d’Études Augusti-
niennes, Paris 2000, 495-506), when Augustine was at his career’s peak time. It might still have been a matter of 
influence. To a lot of his less prominent colleagues this was probably the recurring scheme. Yet I think the 
context of the sermon also allows the conclusion that he frequently went there in vain and was embarrassed, 
since the people in whose favour he had done something had told a wrong story. It should be left to the judges 
installed to decide upon a soldier the crowd wanted to revenge upon, Augustine argued; see esp. 302, 21 where 
he demanded that his listeners respect the authorities and let them do their duty. 
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bought and farmers exploited by their landlords. Injustices resulted not from 
the body of administration, not from its regulations and prohibitions, courts and 
appeal-courts, but from the weak human condition. Advocates earned money to 
defend their clients whatever their case might be; judges accepted money for 
their verdicts: one sometimes had to pay money even for a just verdict: “These 
gains (the earnings of corruption) are as wrongly possessed as those that come 
through theft”, “and I would demand their restitution, but there is no judge un-
der whom they can be claimed.”122 In Augustine’s experience it was beyond his 
immediate influence and rested in God’s hand: a confession of powerlessness 
by an otherwise strong-minded and always highly committed bishop in the Afri-
can province of Numidia. He only could demand (vellem), but could not always 
be the deciding judge in his comparably unimportant bishop’s court.123 Thus 
until final judgement, the just cause fell often short. For Augustine this shortfall 
was exemplified by the suffering of humillimus Christ.124 Other than Ambrose 
Augustine never challenged any imperial authority. After the judicial murder of 
Marcellinus he fled Carthage instead of pleading for the release of the remain-
ing political suspects.125 He was anxious to emphasize his absence when mem-
bers of his congregation in an act of rebellious self-help liberated 120 people 
(kidnapped children mainly), who were about to be shipped into slavery by Ga-
latian merchants from the shore of Hippo. He does however emphasize that 
“our people” (nostris) knew about the “custom to take pity on misery” (mos 
eleemosynae). 126 
Nonetheless Augustine had read his Cicero and had developed his ideas of 
justice and the hierarchy of the laws from this starting point: from a Roman 
senator and statesman, struggling in the decline of the Roman res publica. So 
against Pelagius’ ascetic elitism, Augustine in Ciceronian tradition promoted the 
idea of a statesman and judge who involved himself; who in an active life (vita 
activa) saw to it that the laws of the world reflected divine justice and that they 
were observed. And then his role as bishop was to broker for a Christian cari-
                                                 
122 AUG. Ep. 153, 25 (CSEL 44, 426): Haec atque hujusmodi male utique possidentur, et vellem restituerentur; 
sed non est quo judice repetantur. Augustine’s letter to Count Macedonius well displays his dark view on self-
righteous people and on forensic bribery. 
123 Cf. C. LEPELLEY, Les cités, 398. GAUDEMET, L’Église, 351, stresses how the bishop legally to significant 
extent remained a private person. C. ANDO, Religion and ius publicum, in C. ANDO - J. RÜPKE (ed.), Religion 
and Law in Classical and Christian Rome, Steiner, Stuttgart 2006, 126-145 holds that Theodosius did not suc-
ceed in establishing the lex Christiana and so Augustine remained an outsider. 
124 DIEHLE, Gerechtigkeit, 358 refers to AUG. En. Ps. 61, 4 (CCL 39, 774), where Christ is referred to as king 
Zion who was made the most humble man. 
125 Cf. BROWN, Augustine, 337; O’DONNELL, Augustine, 225. 
126 AUG. Ep. 10*, 7 (CSEL 88, 50). Augustine uses the legally vague expression from the Scriptures: non defuit 
fidelis morem nostrum in elemosynis huiusmodi sciens qui hoc nuntiaret ecclesiae …a nostris liberati sunt me 
quidem absente. See H. BOLKESTEIN - W. SCHWER, Almosen, in Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, 
vol. I (1950), 301f. 
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tas, that was so much closer to divine justice than any procedural and for this 
purpose only property-managing or order-restoring regulation. To Augustine, 
the office and duty of a bishop was to lead in this enterprise. His conversion to 
Christianity was the turning point: the imitation and following of Christus iustus 
et iustificans became essential to find the vera iustitia and crucial to Christian 
life and leadership.127 From there he would draw his main legitimacy to instruct, 
admonish and teach about truth as bishop and judge. Christ was the source of 
his call to be followed even by imperial officers of the highest status in matters 
of justice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
127 Again see S. ELM, Der Asket, especially 196 and 201. 
